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This	   paper	  maps	   judicial	   self-­‐government	   in	   Czechia	   and	   argues	   that	   although	  Czechia	   is	  
sometimes	  perceived	  as	  a	  black	   sheep	  of	  Europe	   for	  not	   introducing	  any	   form	  of	   judicial	  
council	   into	   its	   judicial	   system,	   there	   is	   in	   fact	   a	   substantial	   amount	   of	   judicial	   self-­‐
government	  exercised	  by	   several	  bodies,	   the	  most	   important	  being	   the	  court	  presidents,	  
and	  it	  is	  therefore	  a	  mistake	  to	  conflate	  judicial	  self-­‐government	  with	  judicial	  councils.	  The	  
most	  notable	  changes	  to	  judicial	  self-­‐government	  are	  then	  introduced	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  
values	   crucial	   for	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   judiciary	   assessed.	   And,	   as	   the	   judicial	   self-­‐
government	  in	  Czechia	  is	  primarily	  exercised	  by	  court	  presidents,	  the	  narrative	  of	  changes	  
to	   judicial	   self-­‐government	   and	   their	   impact	   is	   presented	   as	   a	   narrative	   of	   changes	  
affecting	  court	  presidents	  and	  of	  their	  effects	  on	  the	  wider	  legal,	  social	  and	  political	  fields.	  
The	  dominance	  of	   court	  presidents,	  built	   in	  part	  on	   informal	  powers,	   is	   a	  mixed	  blessing	  
however,	  as	   it	  can	  have	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	   impact	  on	  the	  crucial	  values	  and	  may	  
prove	  rather	  fragile	  in	  the	  future.	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At	   first	   sight,	   Czechia	   does	   not	   differ	   from	   most	   European	   countries	   as	   far	   as	   the	  
organization	  of	  justice	  is	  concerned.	  Its	  judicial	  system	  consists	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  
and	   the	   'ordinary'	   court	   system,	   which	   is	   comprised	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   (SC),	   the	  
Supreme	  Administrative	  Court	  (SAC),	  high	  courts,	  regional	  courts	  and	  district	  courts.	  Apart	  
from	  the	  top	  two	  courts	  and	  the	  district	  courts,	  all	  the	  ordinary	  courts	  decide	  on	  criminal,1	  
civil	  and	  administrative	  matters.	  However,	  there	  is	  something	  that	  makes	  Czechia	  special	  –	  
unlike	  many	  of	   its	  European	  counterparts,	  Czechia	  has	  never	  had	  a	   judicial	   council,	   i.e.	  a	  
body	   that	   centralizes	   the	   administration	   of	   courts	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   judges.	   In	   this	   sense	  
Czechia,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  judicial	  self-­‐government	  (JSG),	  is	  the	  proverbial	  “black	  sheep”.2	  
During	  the	  1990’s	  and	  2000’s,	  when	  many	  of	  the	  candidate-­‐countries	  for	  accession	  to	  the	  
European	  Union	  adopted	  the	  Euro-­‐model	  of	  judicial	  council,	  Czechia	  resisted	  and	  retained	  
its	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  model	  with	  roots	  in	  the	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  Empire.3	  
	  
Even	   though	   there	   is	   no	   judicial	   council	   as	   yet	   and	   many	   hold	   the	   opinion	   that	   its	  
introduction	  is	  long	  overdue,	  it	  cannot	  be	  said	  that	  there	  is	  no	  JSG	  in	  Czechia.	  In	  fact,	  quite	  
the	   contrary	   is	   true.4	   Two	   crucial	   actors	   stand	   at	   the	   center	   of	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Justice	  
model,	  in	  whose	  hands	  lie	  most	  of	  the	  personal,	  administrative	  and	  financial	  affairs	  of	  the	  
judiciary:	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  (MoJ)	  and	  the	  court	  presidents	  (CPs).5	  Several	  other	  actors	  
complement	   them.	  They	  are	   the	  President	  of	   the	  Czech	  Republic,	  who	   formally	  appoints	  
judges	  and	  CPs	  (and	   in	  the	  past	  also	  attempted	  to	  dismiss	  them),	  disciplinary	  panels	   (the	  
only	  body	  with	  the	  power	  to	  dismiss	   judges),	   judicial	  boards	  functioning	  as	  a	  consultative	  
body	  at	  each	  court,	  and	  the	  Judicial	  Academy,	  responsible	  for	  educating	  present	  and	  future	  
judges.6	  It	  is	  thus	  clear	  that	  actors	  from	  within	  the	  judiciary	  play	  a	  rather	  important	  role	  in	  
the	  matters	  of	  judicial	  government	  (see	  Table	  1	  below).	  
                                            
1	  Note	  that	  prosecutors	  do	  not	  form	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Czech	  judiciary	  but	  are	  independent	  from	  it.	  
2	   See	   David	   Kosař,	   Politics	   of	   Judicial	   Independence	   and	   Judicial	   Accountability	   in	   Czechia:	   Bargaining	   in	   the	  
Shadow	  of	  the	  Law	  between	  Court	  Presidents	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  13	  EUROPEAN	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  LAW	  REVIEW	  
13,	  97	  (2017).	  
3	  Michal	  Bobek,	  The	  Administration	  of	  Courts	  in	  the	  Czech	  Republic	  –	  In	  Search	  of	  a	  Constitutional	  Balance,	  16	  EUR.	  
PUB.	  L.	  251	  (2010);	  and,	  generally,	  Michal	  Bobek	  &	  David	  Kosař,	  Global	  Solutions,	  Local	  Damages:	  A	  Critical	  Study	  
in	  Judicial	  Councils	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  15	  GERMAN	  L.J.	  1257	  (2014).	  
4	  We	  define	  a	  JSG	  body	  as	  a	  body	  with	  at	  least	  one	  judge	  whose	  primary	  function,	  entrenched	  in	  a	  legal	  norm,	  is	  
to	   decide	   about	   issues	   regarding	   court	   administration	   and/or	   the	   career	   of	   a	   judge,	   and/or	   advise	   those	  who	  
decide	  about	  such	  issues.	  
5	  DAVID	  KOSAŘ,	  PERILS	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  SELF-­‐GOVERNMENT	  IN	  TRANSITIONAL	  SOCIETIES	  176	  (2016).	  
6	  For	  further	  information	  regarding	  the	  Czech	  judicial	  environment	  and	  its	  actors	  see	  especially	  Michal	  Bobek,	  The	  
Fortress	  of	  Judicial	  Independence	  and	  the	  Mental	  Transitions	  of	  the	  Central	  European	  Judiciaries,	  14	  EUR.	  PUB.	  L.	  99	  
(2008);	  Bobek,	  supra	  note	  3;	  KOSAŘ,	  supra	  note	  5;	  Zdeněk	  Kühn,	  The	  Democratization	  and	  Modernization	  of	  Post-­‐
Communist	  Judiciaries,	  in	  CENTRAL	  AND	  EASTERN	  EUROPE	  AFTER	  TRANSITION	  177	  (Alberto	  Febbrajo	  &	  Wojciech	  Sadurski	  
eds.,	   2010);	   ZDENĚK	   KÜHN,	   THE	   JUDICIARY	   IN	   CENTRAL	   AND	   EASTERN	   EUROPE:	   MECHANICAL	   JURISPRUDENCE	   IN	  
TRANSFORMATION?	  (2011);	  Zdeněk	  Kühn,	  Judicial	  Administration	  Reforms	   in	  Central-­‐Eastern	  Europe:	  Lessons	  to	  be	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The	  aim	  of	  this	  article	  is	  to	  provide	  complex	  insight	  into	  the	  functioning	  of	  JSG	  in	  Czechia	  
and	  an	  overview	  of	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  wider	  legal,	  social	  and	  political	  fields.	  We	  claim	  that	  
the	   case	  of	  Czechia	  proves	   it	   is	   a	  mistake	   to	   conflate	   JSG	  only	  with	   judicial	   councils,	   and	  
that	  JSG	  can	  exist	  without	  them.	  In	  Czechia,	  it	  was	  the	  CPs	  who	  built	  and	  preserved	  a	  great	  
deal	  of	  JSG,	  but,	  at	  the	  price	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  transparency	  and	  fragility	  of	  the	  balance	  between	  
all	   actors	   involved.	   Section	   A	   thus	   provides	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   actors	   and	   a	   historical	  
context	  of	  their	  evolution;	  Section	  B	  tracks	  the	  impact	  of	  changes	  in	  JSG	  on	  values	  that	  are	  
critical	   for	   the	   functioning	  of	   the	   judiciary,	   namely	   judicial	   independence,	   accountability,	  
transparency,	  public	   confidence	  and	   legitimacy;	  and	  Section	  C	  assesses	   the	   influence	   the	  
JSG	  had	  on	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  and	  the	  democratic	  principle.	  Section	  D	  then	  briefly	  
concludes.	  
Table	  1:	  Bodies	  and	  actors	  of	  judicial	  government	  and	  self-­‐government	  in	  Czechia	  
	  
	  
A.	  Of	  Court	  Presidents…	  and	  Others:	  Forms	  and	  Rationales	  of	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Government	  
	  
This	  section	  maps	  the	  key	  JSG	  bodies	  in	  Czechia;	  their	  powers,	  composition	  and	  functioning	  
are	  discussed	   in	   the	   first	  part.	   The	   following	  part	   then	   traces,	  where	   relevant,	   rationales	  
behind	   the	   introduction	   of	   those	   bodies	   and	   key	   changes	   made	   to	   them	   (i.e.	   critical	  
junctures	  in	  their	  development).	  The	  overall	  picture	  is	  that	  even	  though	  there	  are	  several	  
JSG	  bodies,	   the	  primary	   role	   is	  played	  by	   the	  CPs,	  and	   the	  narrative	  of	   changes	   to	   JSG	   is	  
predominantly	  a	  narrative	  of	  changes	  in	  CP	  powers	  or	  attempts	  to	  take	  powers	  away	  from	  
CPs.	  
	  
	   	  
                                                                                                                
Learned,	  in	  JUDICIAL	  INDEPENDENCE	  IN	  TRANSITION	  613	  (Anja	  Seibert-­‐Fohr	  ed.,	  2012);	  and	  HLEDÁNÍ	  OPTIMÁLNÍHO	  MODELU	  
SPRÁVY	  SOUDNICTVÍ	  PRO	  ČESKOU	  REPUBLIKU	  (Jan	  Kysela	  ed.,	  2008).	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I.	  Overview	  of	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Government	  Bodies	  
	  
Court	   presidents	   are	   arguably	   the	   most	   important	   and	   powerful	   JSG	   actors	   inside	   and	  
outside	  the	  judiciary	  in	  Czechia.7	  Firstly,	  they	  are	  key	  players	  in	  personal	  JSG,	  as	  they	  play	  a	  
significant	   role	   in	   the	   careers	  of	   judges	   from	  beginning	   to	  end	  and	  have	  a	   say	   in	   judges’	  
appointments,	  secondments,	  reassignments	  and	  promotions8	  and	  hold	  the	  power	  to	  file	  a	  
disciplinary	  motion.9	  More	   specifically,	   the	   consent	   of10	   or	   consultation	  with11	   CPs	   is	   de	  
jure	  needed	   for	   the	   appointment	  of	   a	   judge	   to	   “their”	   courts.12	  Nonetheless,	   due	   to	   the	  
lack	  of	   formal	   legal	   criteria,	   it	   is	   the	  CPs	   themselves	  who	  de	   facto	   create	   the	   criteria	   for	  
selecting	  judges,	  and	  they	  hand-­‐pick	  them,13	  thus	  serving	  as	  gatekeepers	  to	  the	  judiciary.14	  
Court	  presidents	  also	  wield	   significant	  managerial	  powers	   regarding	   their	   courts,	   ranging	  
from	  staffing	  the	  courts	  with	  administrative	  personnel	  and	  controlling	  the	  court’s	  budget15	  
to	  creating	   rules	   for	  case	  assignment,	  assigning	   judges	   to	  panels	  and	  selecting	   judges	   for	  
grand	  chambers	  at	  top	  courts	  (administrative	  and	  financial	  JSG).16	  
	  
Secondly,	   CPs	   form	   two	   informal	   groups	   which	   also	   exert	   strong	   influence	   outside	   the	  
judiciary	  (normative	  JSG):	  the	  college	  of	  presidents	  of	  regional	  courts	  and	  the	  trinity	  of	  top	  
courts	  presidents.	  The	  college	  of	  presidents	  of	  regional	  courts	  consists	  of	  the	  presidents	  of	  
all	  eight	  regional	  courts	  who	  meet	  four	  times	  a	  year.	  Their	  significance	  is	  underlined	  by	  the	  
                                            
7	  Kühn	  2012,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  609.	  
8	  Art.	  73	  of	  the	  Law	  No.	  6/2002	  Coll.,	  On	  the	  Courts	  and	  Judges.	  
9	  Art.	  8(c)	  to	  (g)	  of	  the	  Law	  No.	  7/2002	  Coll.,	  the	  Code	  of	  Disciplinary	  Procedure	  with	  Judges	  and	  Prosecutors.	  
10	  This	  goes	  for	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Administrative	  Court,	  see	  art.	  70	  of	  the	  Law	  No.	  6/2002	  Coll.,	  
On	  the	  Courts	  and	  Judges,	  and	  art.	  124	  of	  the	  No.	  150/2002	  Coll.,	  the	  Code	  of	  Administrative	  Justice.	  
11	  This	  goes	  for	  the	  presidents	  for	  high	  and	  regional	  courts;	  see	  art.	  73	  of	  the	  Law	  No.	  6/2002	  Coll.,	  On	  the	  Courts	  
and	   Judges.	  Assignment	   to	   the	  district	  courts	  needs	   to	  be	   in	  consultation	  with	   the	  presidents	  of	   the	   respective	  
regional	  courts,	  who	  are	  thus	  “masters”	  of	  district	  courts	  as	  well.	  	  
12	  An	  attempt	  by	  the	  former	  president	  of	  the	  Czech	  Republic,	  Václav	  Klaus,	  to	  circumvent	  this	  rule	  was	  thwarted	  
by	  the	  Czech	  Constitutional	  Court;	  for	  a	  concise	  description	  of	  the	  circumstances,	  see	  KOSAŘ,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  174–
175,	  and	  Bobek,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  263–265.	  
13	  For	  further	  details	  on	  the	  selection	  of	  judges,	  see	  KOSAŘ,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  188–191	  and	  215–216.	  The	  rules	  for	  
the	   selection	   of	   judges	   for	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   and	   the	   Supreme	   Administrative	   Court	   are	   set	   out	   in	   publicly	  
available	   court	   presidents’	  memoranda;	   at	   the	   regional	   court	   level,	   the	   situation	   is	   rather	   chaotic,	   see	   Kristián	  
Léko,	  Výběr	  českých	  soudců	  ovládá	  chaos,	  LIDOVÉ	  NOVINY,	  June	  5,	  2017.	  
14	  Kühn	  2012,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  612;	  and	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  97	  and	  100.	   	  
15	  Arts.	  124	  to	  127	  of	  the	  Law	  No.	  6/2002	  Coll.,	  On	  the	  Courts	  and	  Judges;	  Art.	  29	  of	  the	  Law	  No.150/2002	  Coll.,	  
the	  Code	  of	  Administrative	  Justice.	  
16	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  100.	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fact	  that	  it	  is	  reportedly	  difficult	  to	  push	  any	  change	  without	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  college.17	  
The	  trinity	  of	  top	  courts	  presidents18	  is	  formed	  by	  the	  presidents	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  the	  
Supreme	   Administrative	   Court	   and	   the	   Constitutional	   Court.	   Each	   of	   the	   presidents	   has	  
always	   exercised	   a	   significant	   influence	   on	   the	   Czech	   judiciary,19	   and	   since	   2015,	   they	  
solidified	  their	  position	  by	  sharing	  their	  views	  at	  regular	  informal	  meetings.20	  
	  
Judicial	  boards	  are	  advisory	  bodies	  that,	  since	  2002,	  exist	  at	  almost	  every	  court.21	  Judicial	  
boards	   are	   composed	   of	   three	   to	   five	   judges	   of	   the	   respective	   court	   elected	   by	   all	   the	  
court’s	  judges	  for	  a	  five-­‐year	  term.	  Their	  task	  is	  to	  comment	  on	  various	  issues	  concerning	  
the	   functioning	   of	   the	   court:	   candidates	   for	   the	   positions	   of	   the	   president	   and	   vice-­‐
president	   of	   the	   court,	   temporary	   and	  permanent	   secondment	   of	   judges,	   drafts	   of	  work	  
schedules	   setting	   rules	   for	   case	   assignment	   etc.22	   Owing	   to	   the	   non-­‐binding	   nature	   of	  
judicial	   boards’	   recommendations	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   CPs	   partly	   set	   their	   agenda,	   the	  
strength	   of	   judicial	   boards	   depends	   primarily	   on	   the	   personality	   of	   the	   CPs	   and	   their	  
willingness	   to	   cooperate	   and	   listen.23	   Nevertheless,	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  must	   be	   at	   times	  
mandatorily	  consulted	  gives	  them	  some,	  albeit	  informal,	  power.	  
	  
The	   Judicial	   Academy	   prepares	   and	   educates	   future	   judges	   and	   provides	   continuing	  
education	   for	   current	   judges	   and	   other	   persons	   serving	   in	   the	   judicial	   system	   (clerks,	  
advocates,	   notaries,	   public	   prosecutors	   etc.),24	   thus	   playing	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   educational	  
JSG.	   The	   Judicial	   Academy,	   established	   in	   2002,	   is	   led	   by	   the	   Director	   of	   the	   Judicial	  
Academy,	   appointed	   by	   the	   MoJ,25	   and	   the	   Board	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Academy	   which	  
determines	  the	  content	  of	  the	  education	  provided	  by	  the	  Judicial	  Academy.	  The	  Board	  has	  
15	  members	  and	  is	  composed	  of	  judges	  and	  public	  prosecutors,	  who	  are	  required	  to	  have	  
                                            
17	  The	  minutes	  from	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  college	  are	  sent	  to	  the	  MoJ	  and	  discussed	  there,	  see	  KOSAŘ,	  supra	  note	  5,	  
at	  179–181,	  and	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  100–101.	  
18	  This	  term	  for	  the	  group	  has	  not	  been	  coined	  officially.	  
19	  The	  most	  vocal	  one	  is	  Josef	  Baxa,	  President	  of	  the	  SAC,	  who	  is	  also	  an	  ardent	  supporter	  of	  introducing	  a	  judicial	  
council	  model	  of	  JSG.	  	  
20	  This	  is	  also	  due	  to	  the	  common	  ground	  found	  between	  the	  three	  presidents,	  Josef	  Baxa	  (SAC),	  Pavel	  Šámal	  (SC),	  
and	  Pavel	  Rychetský	  (CC);	  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  101.	  
21	  Where	  there	  is	  fewer	  than	  11	  judges,	  the	  plenary	  session	  consisting	  of	  all	  the	  judges	  fulfils	  the	  tasks	  of	  a	  judicial	  
board;	  see	  Arts.	  46	  and	  47	  of	  the	  Law	  No.	  6/2002	  Coll.,	  on	  Courts	  and	  Judges.	  
22	  Arts.	  50–53	  of	  the	  Law	  No.	  6/2002	  Coll.,	  On	  the	  Courts	  and	  Judges.	  
23	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  178–179.	  
24	  Art.	  129	  to	  133	  of	  the	  Law	  No.6/2002	  Coll.,	  On	  the	  Courts	  and	  Judges.	  
25	  Art	  130(3)	  of	  the	  Law	  No.6/2002	  Coll.,	  On	  the	  Courts	  and	  Judges.	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majority	  together,	  and	  persons	  from	  other	  legal	  professions	  such	  as	  academics,	  advocates	  
or	  notaries.26	  
	  
Disciplinary	  panels	  are	  the	  last	  JSG	  body	  to	  be	  mentioned.	  Since	  2008,	  there	  are	  separate	  
mixed	   disciplinary	   panels	   composed	   of	   three	   judges	   and	   three	   non-­‐judges	   functioning	  
under	   the	   Supreme	   Administrative	   Court.27	   The	   panels	   have	   broad	   powers	   regarding	   a	  
judge’s	  career,	  as	   the	  sanctions	   they	  can	   impose	  on	  disciplined	   judges	   include	  not	  only	  a	  
reprimand	   or	   several	   types	   of	   salary	   reductions,	   but	   also	   their	   dismissal.	   A	   Disciplinary	  
panel’s	   role	   is	   further	   strengthened	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   its	   decisions	   cannot	   be	   appealed.	  
Nevertheless,	   this	   role	   is	   conditioned	   by	   the	   activity	   of	   those	   entitled	   to	   initiate	   the	  
disciplinary	   proceedings	   –	   the	   Minister	   of	   Justice,	   CPs	   and	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Czech	  
Republic.28	  
	  
II.	  Critical	  Junctures:	  Changes	  to	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Government	  
	  
The	  Czech	  model	  of	   court	  administration	  has	   long	   rested	  on	   three	  pillars	  –	   the	  MoJ,	  CPs	  
and	  disciplinary	  panels	  –	  to	  which	  new	  ones	  –	   judicial	  boards	  and	  the	  Judicial	  Academy	  –	  
were	   added	   only	   recently.	   The	  MoJ-­‐CPs-­‐disciplinary	   panel	  model	   of	   court	   administration	  
was	   present	   in	   Czechoslovakia	   ever	   since	   its	   formation	   after	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   Austro-­‐
Hungarian	  Empire.	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  apart	  from	  both	  introducing	  judicial	  boards	  that	  only	  play	  
an	   advisory	   role	   and	   cannot,	   de	   jure,	   decide	   on	   anything	   and	   establishing	   the	   Judicial	  
Academy,	  which	  has	  powers	   related	  only	   to	  a	  narrow	  dimension	  of	  court	  administration,	  
there	  were	  no	  significant	  changes	  to	  the	  JSG	  in	  Czechia	  since	  the	  Velvet	  Revolution.	  None	  
of	  the	  events	  that	  led	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  nation-­‐wide	  judicial	  councils	  in	  other	  countries	  
had	   such	   an	   impact	   in	   Czechia.	   Neither	   the	   revolution	   itself,	   nor	   the	   subsequent	  
democratization	   of	   the	   country	   resulted	   in	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   new	   model	   of	   court	  
administration.	  Neither	  did	  the	  EU	  Accession	  Process:	   in	  1997,	  the	  European	  Commission	  
concluded	  simply	  that	  “[t]he	  Czech	  judiciary	  [was]	  independent”	  and	  it	  thereafter	  devoted	  
little	   attention	   to	   the	   system	   of	   court	   administration	   and	   separation	   of	   powers	   in	   the	  
accession	  progress	  reports	  on	  Czechia.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  fitting	  to	  instead	  discuss	  the	  partial	  
modifications	  of	  the	   long	  existing	  model	  within	  which	  CPs	  can	  be	  considered	  the	  primary	  
                                            
26	   Art	   130(2)	   of	   the	   Law	   No.6/2002	   Coll.,	   On	   the	   Courts	   and	   Judges.	   As	   of	   2017,	   judges	   alone	   do	   not	   have	   a	  
majority	   on	   the	   board,	   although	   the	   rules	   permit	   it:	   there	   are	   7	   judges,	   2	   public	   prosecutors,	   3	   academics,	   1	  
advocate,	  1	  lawyer	  from	  the	  MoJ,	  and	  a	  former	  constitutional	  justice/ombudsman.	  
27	  The	  panel	  is	  composed	  of	  one	  judge	  from	  the	  SAC,	  one	  judge	  from	  the	  SC,	  one	  judge	  from	  regional	  or	  district	  
court,	  one	  attorney,	  one	  state	  prosecutor,	  and	  one	  academic;	  see	  Art.	  4(1)	  of	  the	  Law	  No.7/2002	  Coll.,	  the	  Code	  
of	  Disciplinary	  Procedure	  with	   Judges	  and	  Prosecutors,	  as	  amended	  by	  the	  Law	  No.	  314/2008	  Coll.	   (hereinafter	  
“2008	   Disciplinary	   Code”).	   For	   more	   info	   on	   disciplinary	   panels,	   see	   DAVID	   KOSAŘ	   &	   TEREZA	   PAPOUŠKOVÁ,	   KÁRNÁ	  
ODPOVĚDNOST	  SOUDCE	  V	  PŘERODU:	  PONAUČENÍ	  Z	  ČESKÉ	  REPUBLIKY	  (2017).	  
28	  Art.	  8(2)	  and	  (3)	  of	  the	  2008	  Disciplinary	  Code.	  Note	  that	  the	  Public	  Defender	  of	  Rights	  can	  initiate	  disciplinary	  
proceedings	  as	  well,	  but	  only	  in	  the	  case	  of	  court	  officials.	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JSG	   actors,	   and	  where	   disciplinary	   panels,	   judicial	   boards	   and	   the	   Judicial	   Academy	   play	  
rather	  a	  marginal,	  but	  still	  JSG	  related,	  role.	  
	  
Let	  us	   concentrate	  on	   the	  marginal	   JSG	  bodies	   first.	  Disciplinary	  panels	   existed	   since	   the	  
very	   founding	  of	   the	  Czech	  Republic29	   and	   their	   functioning	  has	   changed	  only	   twice	   –	   in	  
2002	  and	  2008.30	  The	  power	  to	  initiate	  disciplinary	  proceedings	  has	  always	  been	  entrusted	  
to	  CPs	  and	  the	  Minister	  of	   Justice.31	  Since	  2008,	   the	  President	  of	   the	  Czech	  Republic	  and	  
the	   Public	   Defender	   of	   Rights32	   also	   have	   this	   power,	   however	   they	   use	   it	   very	   rarely.33	  
Whereas	   disciplinary	   panels	   have	   always	   been	   empowered	   to	   use	   the	   harshest	   sanction	  
possible	  –	  dismissal	  of	  the	  judge	  facing	  discipline	  –	  as	  well	  as	  to	  decide	  on	  salary	  reductions	  
or	  impose	  reprimands,	  since	  2002	  they	  have	  lost	  the	  power	  to	  reassign	  a	  judge	  to	  a	  court	  
of	   the	   same	   or	   lower	   level.	   Between	   1993	   and	   2008	   disciplinary	   proceedings	  were	   two-­‐
tiered,34	  with	  high	  courts	  or,	  until	  2002,	  regional	  courts	  serving	  as	  the	  first	  instance	  and	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  serving	  as	  the	  appellate	  one.35	  Since	  2008,	  there	  is	  only	  one	  disciplinary	  tier	  
–	   the	  Supreme	  Administrative	  Court.	   It	  has	  always	  been	   the	  case	   that	  disciplinary	  panels	  
were	  composed	  of	  judges,	  however,	  since	  2008	  non-­‐judges	  were	  added	  to	  the	  panels	  and	  
the	  parity	  of	   them	  and	   judges	  was	   introduced.36	  The	  official	   rationale	  behind	  this	  change	  
was	   to	   increase	   the	   objectivity	   of	   disciplinary	   panels’	   decision-­‐making	   and	   to	   enrich	  
disciplinary	   proceedings	   with	   views	   that	   cannot	   be	   expected	   of	   judicial	   members	   of	  
disciplinary	  panels.37	  The	  real	  aim	  was	  then	  to	  tighten	  the	  proceedings.38	  	  
	  
                                            
29	  In	  fact	  they	  existed	  even	  before,	  in	  Czechoslovakia.	  See	  MICHAL	  PRINC.	  SOUDNICTVÍ	  V	  ČESKÝCH	  ZEMÍCH	  V	  LETECH	  1848–
1938	  (SOUDY,	  SOUDNÍ	  OSOBY,	  DOBOVÉ	  PROBLÉMY)	  143–149	  (2015).	  
30	   See	   the	   Law	   No.	   412/1991	   Coll.,	   on	   Disciplinary	   Liability	   of	   Judges,	   the	   Law	   No.	   7/2002	   Coll.,	   the	   Code	   of	  
Disciplinary	   Procedure	   with	   Judges	   and	   Prosecutors	   (hereinafter	   “2002	   Disciplinary	   Code”)	   and	   the	   2008	  
Disciplinary	  Code.	  
31	  Note	   that	   from	  2002	   to	  2008	  a	   judge	  accused	  of	   an	  offense	   could	   request	   that	   the	  offense	  be	  dealt	  with	   in	  
disciplinary	  proceedings.	   Previously,	   the	   law	  enforcement	  authorities	   could	   refer	   the	  matter	   to	   the	  disciplinary	  
panels.	  
	  	  
32	  Nevertheless,	  she	  can	  initiate	  the	  disciplinary	  proceedings	  only	  against	  court	  officials.	  
33	   David	   Kosař	  &	   Tereza	   Papoušková,	  Přinesla	   “Pospíšilova”	   reforma	   kárného	   řízení	   skutečně	   zpřísnění	   kárného	  
postihu	  českých	  soudců?	  25	  ČASOPIS	  PRO	  PRÁVNÍ	  VĚDU	  A	  PRAXI	  219	  (2017).	  
34	  From	  1993	  to	  2002,	  the	  proceedings	  were	  only	  one-­‐tiered	  for	  judges	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  
35	  Art.	  5	  of	  the	  Law	  No.	  412/1991	  Coll.,	  on	  Disciplinary	  Liability	  of	  Judges	  and	  art.	  3	  of	  the	  2002	  Disciplinary	  Code.	  
36	  For	  information	  on	  composition	  of	  the	  panels	  see	  supra	  note	  27.	  
37	  See	  the	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  to	  the	  Law	  No.	  314/2008	  Coll.,	  amending,	  among	  else,	  the	  Law	  No.	  7/2002	  
Coll.,	  the	  Code	  of	  Disciplinary	  Procedure	  with	  Judges	  and	  Prosecutors.	  
38	  KOSAŘ	  &	  PAPOUŠKOVÁ,	  supra	  note	  27.	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Judicial	   boards	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Judicial	   Academy	   were	   established	   by	   law39	   in	   2002.	   The	  
rationale	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Academy	  was	  simple	  –	  to	  ensure	  the	  quality	  
of	  judging	  by	  centralizing	  and	  regulating	  the	  life-­‐long	  education	  of	  judges.	  As	  this	  aim	  was	  
widely	   supported,	   there	   were	   no	   real	   competing	   proposals	   and	   the	   only	   discussion	  
concerned	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  position	  of	  the	  JA.40	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Constitutional	  
Court	   found	   the	   provisions	   obliging	   judges	   to	   complete	   further	   education	   of	   a	   specified	  
length,	  provided	  by	  a	  determined	  body	  and	  resulting	  in	  the	  evaluation	  of	  a	  judge	  that	  could	  
lead	   to	  her	   dismissal	   unconstitutional.41	  Another	   rationale	   going	  beyond	   this	   aim,	   added	  
into	  the	  relevant	  bill	  only	  later,	  was	  to	  empower	  the	  JA	  to	  also	  ensure	  that	  people	  entering	  
the	  judiciary	  as	   law	  clerks	  are	  of	  certain	  professional	  quality.	  However,	  although	  the	  JA	  is	  
to	  express	   its	  views	  on	  a	   judicial	   trainee,	  who	   is,	   in	  the	  end,	  selected	  by	  the	  president	  of	  
the	   relevant	   regional	   court,	   it	  hardly	  ever	  does	   so.42	  The	   rationales	  and	  consequences	  of	  
the	   introduction	   of	   judicial	   boards	   are	   discussed	   a	   bit	   later	   along	   with	   the	   limitations	  
placed	  on	  the	  leeway	  CPs	  have	  for	  exercising	  their	  powers.	  
	  
We	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  crucial	  JSG	  body,	  court	  presidents.	  As	  already	  emphasized,	  CPs	  always	  
had	   the	   major	   say	   in	   court	   administration	   and	   the	   careers	   of	   individual	   judges.	  
Nevertheless,	   the	  entities	  that	  could	  determine	  or	   influence	  the	  way	  they	  exercised	  their	  
powers	  differed.	  At	  first,	  until	  1989,	  CPs	  de	  facto	  served	  as	  the	  “transmission	  belt”,	  as	  they	  
could	  be	  recalled	  by	  the	  Communist	  Party	  anytime	  at	  a	  whim	  and	  had	  to	  “transmit”	  orders	  
from	   the	  Communist	  Party	   to	   individual	   judges	   in	   sensitive	   cases.	  This	   changed	  after	   the	  
Velvet	  Revolution.	  Not	  only	  was	   the	  MoJ	  no	   longer	  under	   the	   control	  of	   the	  Communist	  
Party,	   but	   it	   practically	   stopped	   exercising	   its	   influence	   on	   CPs,	   even	   though	   it	   de	   jure	  
could,	  as	  the	  Minister	  still	  had	  the	  power	  to	  recall	  CPs	  at	  any	  time.43	  There	  are	  two	  major	  
reasons	  why	   the	   “transmission	   belt”	   argument	   no	   longer	  worked	   in	   Czechia.	   First,	  most	  
ministers	  desperately	  wanted	   to	  avoid	   this	   type	  of	   confrontation,	  which	  would	  hand	   the	  
opposition	   parties	   the	   proverbial	   stick	   with	   which	   to	   beat	   the	   Minister	   and	   the	   ruling	  
coalition.44	  Second,	  as	  CPs	  remained	   in	  office	  much	   longer	  than	  the	  Ministers	  of	   Justice45	  
                                            
39	  Law	  No.	  6/2002	  Coll.,	  on	  Courts	  and	  Judges.	  
40	   In	   the	   end,	   judges	   can	   fulfil	   their	   obligation	   to	   educate	   themselves	   also	   by	   attending	   education	   events	  
organized	  by	  other	  courts	  and	  universities.	  
41	  Judgment	  of	  the	  Czech	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  18	  June	  2002,	  case	  no.	  Pl.	  ÚS	  7/02.	  
	  
42	  See	  the	  next	  Section	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  selection	  of	  judicial	  personnel.	  
43	  Note	  that	  presidents	  of	  top	  three	  courts	  (the	  Supreme,	  the	  Supreme	  Administrative	  and	  the	  Constitutional)	  are	  
appointed	  and	  recalled	  by	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Czech	  Republic.	  Nevertheless,	  analogical	  argumentation	  applies.	  
44	  In	  the	  1990s	  some	  Ministers	  dared	  to	  take	  the	  risk.	  For	  instance,	  when	  Otakar	  Motejl	  became	  the	  Minister	  of	  
Justice	   in	   1998,	   he	   soon	   dismissed	   five	   of	   the	   eight	   regional	   court	   presidents.	   However,	  Motejl’s	   gravitas	  was	  
rather	  unique.	  
45	  There	  were	  16	  ministers	  of	  justice	  between	  1993	  and	  2015	  and	  the	  average	  length	  of	  their	  terms	  was	  less	  than	  
two	  years.	  In	  contrast,	  most	  CPs	  held	  office	  for	  more	  than	  a	  decade.	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they	  had	  the	  best	  overview	  of	  what	  was	  going	  on	  within	  the	  judiciary	  and	  this	  information	  
asymmetry	   worked	   in	   their	   favour.	   Therefore,	   after	   1989,	   no	   other	   entity	   was	   able	   to	  
significantly	  influence	  the	  way	  CPs	  exercised	  their	  JSG-­‐related	  powers.	  
	  
This	   changed	   in	   2002	   with	   the	   introduction	   of	   judicial	   boards.	   Entrusted	   only	   with	  
consultative	  function,	  judicial	  boards	  were	  meant	  to	  “address	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  involvement	  
of	  judges	  in	  the	  court	  administration”46	  and	  to	  advise	  CPs	  on	  how	  they	  should	  administer	  
their	  court	  and	  treat	  its	  judges.	  When	  the	  government	  submitted	  the	  relevant	  bill,	  judicial	  
boards	  were	  also	  supposed	  to	  evaluate	  judges	  and	  submit	  proposals	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  
their	   professional	   competence.	   However,	   discussions	   in	   the	   Chamber	   of	   Deputies’	  
Constitutional	  Law	  Committee,	  to	  which	  representatives	  of	  the	  judiciary	  were	  also	  invited,	  
resulted	   in	   the	   compromise	   conclusion	   that	   judicial	   boards	   were	   to	   have	   only	   advisory	  
competences.	  The	  lack	  of	  will	  to	  create	  any	  new	  JSG	  body	  and	  the	  urge	  to	  take	  a	  step	  that	  
would	   at	   least	   simulate	   its	   creation	   were	   the	   results	   of	   the	   2000	   rejection	   of	   the	  
constitutional	  bill	  establishing	  a	  nation-­‐wide	  JC	  with	  relatively	  substantive	  powers	  that	  will	  
be	  discussed	  below.	  
	  
The	   year	   2002	   brought	   yet	   another	   modification.	   An	   informal	   body	   potentially	   able	   to	  
influence	  the	  way	  CPs	  exercised	  their	  powers	  emerged.	  This	  entity	  was	  formed	  by	  the	  eight	  
presidents	   of	   regional	   courts	  who	   decided	   to	  meet	   regularly47	   to	   discuss	   practical	   issues	  
that	   affected	   all	   regional	   courts	   and	   take	   the	   lead	   in	   judicial	   reform.48	   Although	   this	  
informal	   body	   –	   the	   college	   of	   regional	   court	   presidents	   –	   had	   no	   statutory	   basis,49	   the	  
costs	  of	   its	  meetings	  were	  and	  still	  are	  covered	  by	   the	   regional	  court	  budgets	  and,	  more	  
importantly,	   its	   voice	   is	   often	   heard	   not	   only	   in	   professional	   circles,	   but	   also	   in	   public	  
debates.	  
	  
Another	  modification,	  this	  time	  greatly	  influencing	  the	  position	  of	  CPs,	  came	  in	  2008,	  when	  
the	  limitation	  of	  their	  term	  of	  office	  was	  enacted.50	   It	   is	  true	  that	  until	  then	  the	  law	  gave	  
                                            
46	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  to	  the	  Law	  No.	  6/2002	  Coll.,	  on	  Courts	  and	  Judges.	  
47	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  100,	  who	  claims	  that	  according	  to	  one	  of	  the	  “founding	  fathers”	  of	  the	  body,	  the	  
idea	  of	  creating	  an	   informal	  association	  of	   regional	  court	  presidents	  was	  suggested	  to	   them	  by	  Mr	   Jean-­‐Michel	  
Peltier,	  a	  French	  liaison	  magistrate	  in	  Prague.	  	  
48	  Id.	  	  
49	   Id.	   In	  2007,	  presidents	  of	  regional	  courts	  attempted	  to	  formalize	  the	  college,	  but	  both	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  
and	  the	  presidents	  of	  the	  top	  courts	  rejected	  that	  idea.	  
50	   Law	  No.	   314/2008	   Coll.,	   amending,	   among	   other	   things,	   the	   Law	   on	   Courts	   and	   Judges.	   Note	   that	   this	   very	  
amendment	  also	  transferred	  the	  power	  to	  discipline	  judges	  from	  exclusively	  judicial	  panels	  at	  high	  courts	  (and	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  acting	  as	  the	  appellate	  body)	  to	  mixed	  panels	  (composed	  of	  three	  judges	  and	  three	  non-­‐judges)	  at	  
the	  Supreme	  Administrative	  Court.	  	  
1960 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	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  19	  No.	  07	  
the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  the	  power	  to	  dismiss	  CPs	  at	  any	  time,51	  however	  this	  power	  was,	  for	  
the	  reasons	  outlined	  above,	  de	  facto	  non-­‐exercisable.52	  The	  enactment	  of	  a	  7-­‐year	  limit	  for	  
officials	   of	   ordinary	   courts	   and	   a	   10-­‐year	   limit	   for	   officials	   of	   the	   two	   supreme	   courts53	  
came	  as	  a	   reaction	   to	  CPs’	  efforts	   to	   secure	   their	   irrevocability,	   also	  de	   jure.	   In	   the	  mid-­‐
2000s,	  Czech	  CPs	  started	  to	  challenge	  their	  dismissals	  before	  administrative	  courts	  and	  the	  
Constitutional	  Court,	  and	  they	  eventually	  won.54	  Moreover,	   in	  2006,	  the	  Czech	  President,	  
for	   the	   first	   time	   ever,	   dared	   to	   dismiss	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court.	   She	  
immediately	   challenged	  her	  dismissal	  before	   the	  Constitutional	  Court.	   The	  Constitutional	  
Court	   decided	   not	   only	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   dismissed	   president,	   but	   also	   struck	   down	   the	  
relevant	   article	   of	   the	   Czech	   Law	   on	   Courts	   and	   Judges	   declaring	   that	   it	   was	  
unconstitutional	   for	   the	   executive	   to	   dismiss	   court	   officials.55	   The	   Constitutional	   Court	  
influenced	  the	  2008	  JSG	  modification	  one	  more	  time	  when	  in	  2010	  it	  not	  only	  found	  that	  
the	   introduction	  of	   limited	   terms	   for	  CPs	  and	   the	  application	  of	   the	   limited	   terms	   to	   the	  
incumbent	  CPs	  were	  constitutional,	  but	  also	  struck	  down	  the	  provision	  that	  allowed	  the	  re-­‐
appointment	   of	   the	   same	   court	   president	   for	   a	   second	   term.56	   Consequently,	   all	   then-­‐
incumbent	   CPs57	   are	   now	   gone,	   which	   is	   the	   most	   important	   change	   within	   the	   Czech	  
judiciary	  since	  the	  Velvet	  Revolution.	  
	  
The	   last	   significant	  modification	  of	   JSG	  constituted	  by	  CPs	   took	  place	   in	  2015.	  This	   is	   the	  
year	   the	   presidents	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   and	   the	   Supreme	  
Administrative	  Court	  created	  an	  informal	  “trinity	  of	  top	  court	  presidents”.	  The	  presidents	  
of	  these	  three	  top	  courts,	  each	  in	  his	  or	  her	  way,	  have	  always	  exercised	  their	  influence	  on	  
the	  Czech	   judiciary.	  However,	   they	  only	   formed	  a	   truly	   cohesive	  group	   in	  2015.	  This	  was	  
prompted	   by	   the	   resignation	   of	   then	   Supreme	   Court	   President	   Iva	   Brožová	   in	   January	  
2015,58	  who	  was	  eventually	   replaced	  by	  Pavel	  Šámal.	  Šámal	  soon	   found	  common	  ground	  
                                            
51	   Note,	   again,	   that	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Czech	   Republic	   could	   have	   dismissed	   the	   presidents	   of	   the	   top	   three	  
courts.	  
52	   Compare	   supra	   note	  46.	   For	  details	   see	  Otakar	  Motejl,	  Pohled	  ministrů	   spravedlnosti,	   in	  HLEDÁNÍ	  OPTIMÁLNÍHO	  
MODELU	  SPRÁVY	  SOUDNICTVÍ	  PRO	  ČESKOU	  REPUBLIKU	  13	  (Jan	  Kysela	  ed.,	  2008).	  	  
53	   Note	   that	   officials	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   are	   selected	   from	   among	   the	   constitutional	   justices,	  who	   are	  
appointed	   for	  a	  period	  of	   ten	  years	   (that	   is,	   as	   the	   tradition	  has	   it,	  once	   renewable),	   therefore	   their	  office	  has	  
always	  been	  limited	  in	  this	  sense.	  
54	  For	  further	  details	  including	  more	  doctrinal	  analysis	  of	  these	  cases	  see	  Bobek,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  263–265.	  
55	  Judgment	  of	  the	  Czech	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  11	  July	  2006,	  case	  no.	  Pl.	  ÚS	  18/06.	  For	  further	  details	  see	  KOSAŘ,	  
supra	  note	  5,	  at	  173–175.	  
56	  Judgment	  of	  the	  Czech	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  6	  October	  2010,	  case	  no.	  Pl.	  ÚS	  39/08.	  
57	  The	  former	  President	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  Iva	  Brožová,	  resigned	  voluntarily	  in	  January	  2015.	  
58	  Iva	  Brožová	  was	  often	  out	  of	  sync	  with	  Pavel	  Rychetský	  and	  Josef	  Baxa.	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with	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  Pavel	  Rychetský,	  and,	  in	  particular,	  with	  the	  
President	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Administrative	  Court,	  Josef	  Baxa.59	  
	  
Apart	  from	  the	  five	  modifications	  of	  CPs’	  position	  within	  the	  judiciary,	  there	  were	  several	  
attempts	   to	   take	   away	   some	   of	   their	   powers	   and	   vest	   them	   in	   a	   nation-­‐wide	   JSG	   body.	  
These	   attempts	   were,	   however,	   except	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Academy,	  
unsuccessful.	  The	  first	  one	  came	  in	  1999	  when	  Otakar	  Motejl,	  the	  then	  Minister	  of	  Justice,	  
introduced	  a	   judicial	   reform	  package60	  which	   consisted	  of	   a	  Constitutional	  Amendment61	  
and	   two	  brand	  new	   laws62	  on	   courts	  and	   judges	  and	  whose	  aim	  was	   to	   replace	   the	  MoJ	  
model	   of	   court	   administration	   with	   the	   Judicial	   Council	   Euro-­‐model.	   More	   concretely,	  
Motejl	  suggested	  establishing	  a	  High	  Council	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  consisting	  of	  sixteen	  members	  
–	  eight	  judges	  and	  eight	  members	  from	  other	  legal	  professions	  –	  elected	  for	  five	  years	  and	  
giving	   it	  broad	  powers	  concerning	  the	  selection	  and	  nomination	  of	  candidates	  for	   judicial	  
office,	  the	  appointment	  and	  dismissal	  of	  judicial	  officials	  as	  well	  as	  the	  training	  of	  judges.	  	  
	  
The	  majority	  of	  deputies	  rejected	  Motejl’s	  reform.63	  There	  are	  various	  explanations	  for	  this	  
failure.	  The	  most	  widely	  accepted	  one	  is	  that	  politicians	  did	  not	  consent	  to	  the	  transfer	  of	  
such	  broad	  powers	  to	  the	   judiciary,	  because	  they	  were	  afraid	  of	   judicial	  corporatism	  and	  
elitism.64	   However,	   several	   commentators	   suggested	   that	   the	   proposal	   failed	   because	   it	  
required	   a	   significant	   amendment	   of	   the	   Czech	   Constitution,65	   as	   Motejl	   was	   an	  
independent	  minister	  without	  sufficient	  political	  support	  even	  within	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  
Party	  that	  appointed	  him,	  as	  judges	  themselves	  were	  divided	  and	  many	  of	  them	  disagreed	  
with	   the	   judicial	   reform	  package	  and	  as	  many	  politicians	   feared	   that	  Motejl	  had	  become	  
“too	  big”	  and	  successful.66	  Motejl	  also	  alienated	  regional	  CPs	  by	  dismissing	  five	  of	  them	  in	  
                                            
59	   Pavel	  Rychetský	  and	   Josef	  Baxa	  have	   known	  each	  other	  well	   since	   the	   late	  1990s,	   as	   Josef	  Baxa	  was	  a	  Vice-­‐
Minister	  of	  Justice	  in	  the	  Government	  of	  Miloš	  Zeman	  (1998–2002)	  at	  the	  same	  time	  Pavel	  Rychetský	  was	  Vice-­‐
PM.	  	  	  
60	  See	  the	  document	  entitled	  Návrh	  koncepce	  reformy	  soudnictví	  [The	  Conception	  of	  the	  Reform	  of	  the	  Judiciary]	  
of	  16	  June	  1999	  (no.	  1097/99-­‐L),	  approved	  by	  the	  Czech	  Government	  by	  the	  decision	  no.	  686	  of	  7	  July	  1999.	  An	  
outline	  of	  the	  reform	  proposal	  was	  published	  as	  a	  special	  supplement	  in	  5	  PRÁVNÍ	  ROZHLEDY	  1,	  1–8	  (1999).	  
61	  See	  the	  Constitutional	  Bill	  No.	  541/0.	  
62	  These	  two	  statutes	  were	  Law	  on	  Courts	  (Bill	  No.	  539/0)	  and	  Law	  on	  Judges	  and	  Lay	  Judges	  (Bill	  No.	  540/0).	  	  
63	  The	  Constitutional	  Bill	  was	  rejected	  in	  the	  second	  reading	  –	  114	  MPs	  voted	  for	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  bill,	  68	  MPs	  
voted	  for	  the	  bill	  –	  and	  the	  other	  two	  bills	  soon	  followed	  the	  same	  fate	  –	  one	  of	  them	  was	  rejected	  by	  71	  MPs	  (69	  
opposed	  the	  motion	  to	  reject	  it)	  and	  the	  second	  one	  by	  85	  MPs	  (81	  opposed).	  
64	  See	  Bobek,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  269.	  
65	  The	  Constitutional	  Bill,	  apart	  from	  introducing	  the	  High	  Council	  of	  the	  Judiciary,	  also	  introduced	  a	  maximum	  age	  
limit	   for	   ordinary	   judges	   and	   Constitutional	   Court	   Justices,	   prohibited	   a	   renewal	   of	   the	   term	   of	   Constitutional	  
Court	  Justices,	  changed	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Czech	  National	  Bank	  and	  amended	  several	  other	  provisions	  of	  the	  Czech	  
Constitution.	  
66	   These	   explanations	   are	   based	   on	   informal	   interviews	  with	   former	   and	   current	   politicians	   and	   CPs,	   but	   they	  
cannot	  be	  corroborated	  by	  the	  hard	  data.	  
1962 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  	   Vol.	  19	  No.	  07	  
1999.	  He	  himself	  in	  retrospect	  blamed	  the	  “judicial	  oligarchy”	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  his	  judicial	  
reform.67	  
	  
The	   second	  attempt	   to	  establish	  a	  new	   JSG	  body	   came	   in	  2002	  when	  Minister	  of	   Justice	  
Jaroslav	  Bureš	  prepared	  the	  new	  Law	  on	  Courts	  and	  Judges,	  which,	  besides	  establishing	  the	  
judicial	  boards,	  strove	  to	   introduce	  the	  Council	   for	  Assessing	  Professional	  Competence	  of	  
Judges.	   This	   body	  was	   to	   be	   divided	   into	   three	   sub-­‐bodies,	   each	   of	   them	   constituted	   by	  
four	  non-­‐judicial	  members	  and	  five	  judicial	  members	  elected	  by	  judges	  of	  selected	  courts	  
for	  a	  three-­‐year	  period,	  and	  was	  to	  be	  empowered	  to	  assess	  the	  professional	  competence	  
of	   judges	   whenever	   asked	   to	   do	   so	   by	   authorized	   proposers;	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	   body	  
were	   to	   be	   appealed	   before	   the	   Supreme	   Court.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	  
struck	   the	   relevant	   part	   of	   the	   law	   down.	   It	   did	   so	   for	   several	   reasons,	   the	   crucial	   ones	  
being	  that	  the	  competence	  of	  judges	  should	  be	  assessed,	  due	  to	  the	  need	  to	  preserve	  their	  
independence,	  only	  before	  their	  appointment	  and	  that	  the	  body	  could	  decide	  on	  the	  non-­‐
competence	  of	  a	  judge	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  only	  seven	  members,	  four	  of	  which	  could	  have	  
been	  the	  non-­‐judicial	  members	  appointed	  by	  the	  executive	  power	  (the	  Minister).	  
	  
The	   last	   attempt	   to	   establish	   a	   new	   JSG	   body	   came	   in	   2012.	   This	   time	   the	  Minister	   of	  
Justice	  (Jiří	  Pospíšil)	  prepared	  a	  bill	  which	  was	  to	  change	  the	  method	  for	  selecting	   judges	  
and	  CPs.68	  More	  specifically,	  it	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  mixed	  commissions,	  composed	  of	  
both	  members	  of	  the	  MoJ	  and	  the	  judiciary,	  who	  would	  select	  new	  judges	  as	  well	  as	  new	  
CPs.	  However,	  Pospíšil	  was	  dismissed	  as	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  before	  he	  could	  present	  the	  bill	  
in	  Parliament.	  The	  new	  minister	  of	  justice	  had	  less	  radical	  views	  regarding	  judicial	  reform,	  
wanted	   to	   maintain	   a	   friendlier	   relationship	   with	   CPs,	   and	   thus	   scrapped	   the	   bill	  
altogether.69	  
	  
To	  summarize,	  while	  there	  were	  five	  successful	  and	  three	  unsuccessful	  attempts	  to	  modify	  
the	   position	   of	   CPs,	   who	   are	   the	   primary	   JSG	   actors,	   little	   has	   changed	   as	   far	   as	   their	  
powers	  are	  concerned.	  Only	  one	  new	  JSG	  body	  that	  took	  away	  some	  of	  the	  CPs’	  powers,	  
the	   Judicial	   Academy,	   was	   introduced.	   However,	   the	   Judicial	   Academy	   was	   vested	   only	  
with	   very	   specific	   powers	   regarding	   educational	   administration	   of	   the	   judiciary	   and	  
therefore	  could	  not	  change	  the	  existing	  model	  of	  court	  administration,	  which,	   in	  Czechia,	  
rests	   on	   three	   pillars	   –	   the	  MoJ,	   CPs	   and	   disciplinary	   panels.	   The	  motives	   for	   preserving	  
such	  a	  model	  are	  simple:	  the	  executive	  was	  hesitant	  to	  give	  up	   its	  powers	  and	  the	  Czech	  
judiciary	  was	  unable	  to	  agree	  on	  the	  one	  way	  it	  wanted	  to	  govern	  itself.	  
                                            
67	  Motejl,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  14.	  	  
68	  The	  2012	  Bill	  also	   intended	  to	   introduce	   judicial	  performance	  evaluation	  and	  financial	  declarations	  of	   judges.	  
Both	  of	  these	  tools	  would	  give	  the	  MoJ	  the	  necessary	  information	  to	  counter	  the	  existing	  information	  asymmetry	  
and	  to	  make	  more	  informed	  decisions	  regarding	  the	  promotion	  of	  judges.	  
69	  See	  Jiří	  Hardoš,	  Blažek	  odložil	  zavedení	  výběrových	  řízení	  na	  nové	  soudce,	  PRÁVO,	  August	  2,	  2012,	  at	  4.	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B.	  Changes	  of	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Government	  and	  the	  Impact	  on	  the	  Wider	  Environment	  
	  
This	  section	  maps	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  changes	  of	  JSG	  on	  the	  wider	  legal,	  political	  and	  social	  
environment.	  We	  map	  the	   impact	  by	  examining	   the	  effect	   the	  changes	  had	  on	   five	  basic	  
values	   that	   we	   consider	   critical	   for	   the	   proper	   functioning	   of	   the	   judiciary	   and	   its	  
relationship	   with	   rest	   of	   the	   society:	   	   judicial	   independence,	   accountability,	   legitimacy,	  
transparency	   and	  public	   confidence.	  We	  have	   already	   said	   that	   there	  was	  no	   “big	  bang”	  
related	  to	   JSG	   in	  Czechia;	   furthermore,	   the	  changes	  we	   identified	   in	   the	  previous	  section	  
are	  not	  necessarily	  connected	  to	  one	  another	  and	  are	  difficult	  to	  arrange	  into	  a	  coherent	  
narrative.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  overall	  picture	  emerging	  from	  this	  section	  is	  that	  the	  judiciary	  
is	   capable	   of	   functioning	   and	   sustaining	   self-­‐governance	   and	   the	  mentioned	   core	   values	  
even	  without	  a	  judicial	  council	  in	  place.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  maintaining	  such	  state	  depends	  
largely	  on	  CPs	  keeping	  their	  powers	  as	  well	  as	  a	  carefully	  balanced	  relationship	  with	  other	  
actors	  of	  judicial	  government	  and	  government	  in	  general.	  
	  
I.	  On	  Mandates,	  Powers	  and	  Independence	  
	  
Even	  though	  there	  was	  no	  JSG	  “big	  bang”	  in	  Czechia,	  three	  notable	  changes	  in	  JSG	  occurred	  
that	  may	  have	  had	  some	  impact	  on	  judicial	  independence,	  concerning	  selection	  of	  judges,	  
CPs’	  mandates,	  and	  work	  schedules.	  All	   the	  changes	  touched	  the	  powers	  or	  mandates	  of	  
the	  CPs,	  proving	  that	  CPs	  have	  a	  substantial	  potential	   to	   influence	   judicial	   independence.	  
And	   although	   their	   position	   gives	   them	   the	   opportunity	   and	   resources	   to	   guard	   the	  
external	   judicial	   independence	   from	  other	   branches	   of	   power	   during	   “peaceful	   times”,70	  
the	  setup	  might	  at	  the	  same	  time	  leave	  individual	  judges	  vulnerable	  and	  create	  a	  space	  for	  
possible	  encroachment	  on	  internal	  judicial	  independence.71	  	  
	  
Selection	  and	  appointment	  of	   judges,	   the	   first	  power	   that	  was	   influenced	  by	  a	  change	   in	  
JSG,	  is	  a	  problematic	  point	  of	  both	  de	  jure	  and	  de	  facto	  independence.	  As	  no	  transparent	  
and	   detailed	   de	   jure	   criteria	   for	   the	   selection	   of	   judges	   exist,	   the	   selection	   lies	   de	   facto	  
primarily	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   CPs.	   Among	   those,	   the	   presidents	   of	   regional	   courts	   play	   a	  
prominent	   role	   as	   the	   law	   specifies	   that	   they	   control	   the	   way	   district	   court	   presidents	  
exercise	  their	  powers.72	  The	  process	  therefore	  differs	   from	  one	  supreme	  or	  high	  court	  to	  
another	   or	   from	   one	   district	   of	   a	   regional	   court	   to	   another,73	   which	   creates	   a	   potential	  
space	  for	  personal	  corruption	  and	  later	  encroachment	  of	  output	  independence	  due	  to	  the	  
                                            
70	  The	  recent	  developments	  in	  Hungary	  and	  Poland	  prove	  that	  if	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  power	  launch	  a	  large-­‐scale	  
offensive	  on	  the	  judiciary,	  there	  is	  little	  that	  actors	  from	  within	  judiciary	  can	  do.	  
71	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  115–122.	  
72	  Art.	  126	  para.	  1	  letter	  h)	  of	  the	  Law	  No.6/2002	  Coll.,	  On	  the	  Courts	  and	  Judges.	  
73	  Being	  appointed	  therefore	  equals	  a	  win	  in	  a	  lottery	  to	  a	  certain	  degree,	  see	  Léko,	  supra	  note	  13.	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personal	  loyalty	  of	  the	  selected	  judges	  to	  the	  relevant	  CP.74	  A	  change	  occurred	  when	  apex	  
court	  presidents	  set	  out	  criteria	  for	  selecting	  judges	  in	  the	  form	  of	  memoranda75	  and	  some	  
regional	  court	  presidents	  even	   introduced	  an	  open	  selection	  procedure	  based	  upon	  tests	  
run	   by	   the	   Judicial	   Academy.76	   This	   step	   led	   partly	   to	   a	  more	   objective	   and	  merit-­‐based	  
selection	   process	   and	   potentially	   limited	   the	   space	   for	   favouritism.	   The	   change	   was,	  
however,	  quite	  small	  and	  happened	  only	  in	  a	  few	  courts	  thanks	  to	  a	  few	  “enlightened”	  CPs.	  
As	  the	  degree	  of	  openness	  lies	  almost	  exclusively	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  CPs,	  however,	  there	  are	  
still	   regions	  with	  no	  open	  selection	  procedure	  whatsoever,	  and	   the	  changes	   that	  already	  
took	  place	  may	  be	  easily	  reversed.	  
	  
The	  second	  change	  in	  JSG	  to	  be	  mentioned	  is	  the	  2008	  implementation	  of	  CP	  term	  limits;	  
these	  may	  have	  had	  the	  biggest	  impact	  on	  the	  judicial	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  so	  far,	  
both	   positively	   and	   negatively.	   This	   move	   first	   of	   all	   meant	   that	   no	   CP	   could	   exert	   his	  
influence	  for	  too	  long.	  Moreover,	  the	  dynamics	  between	  CPs	  and	  the	  MoJ	  changed	  –	  CPs	  
had	   to	   find	   a	   new	   balance	   in	   the	   relationship	   with	   the	   MoJ,	   inventing	   various	   and	  
sometimes	   dubious	   strategies	   to	   preserve	   their	   privileges	   along	   the	   way.	   After	   the	  
expiration	   of	   their	  mandate,	   some	   of	   them	   arranged	   their	   promotion	   to	   a	   higher	   court,	  
some	  switched	  their	  position	  with	  vice-­‐presidents	  and	  some	  even	  openly	  defied	  the	  rules	  
completely	  and	  nominated	  some	  vice-­‐presidents	  for	  second	  terms.77	  The	  change	  therefore	  
clearly	   created	   space	   for	   various	   political	   bargains,	   posing	   significant	   challenges	   also	   to	  
judicial	  independence.	  The	  actual	  impact	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  	  
	  
The	   last	   change	   in	   JSG	  concerned	  work	   schedules,	   issued	  by	  CPs	  and	  containing	  detailed	  
rules	  for	  case	  assignment.	  For	  a	  long	  time,	  the	  attention	  paid	  to	  this	  instrument	  was	  rather	  
limited,78	  which	  created	  a	  space	  for	  possible	  corruption	  and	  attempts	  to	  circumvent	  case	  
assignments.79	  Recently,	  however,	  work	  schedules	  again	  came	  under	  academic	  and	  public	  
scrutiny,80	  as	  it	  came	  to	  light	  that	  some	  CPs	  had	  rigged	  the	  assignment	  of	  bankruptcy	  cases,	  
an	  area	  especially	  prone	  to	  corruption.81	  A	  change	  came	  from	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  that	  
                                            
74	  Note	  that	  there	  is	  no	  research	  or	  direct	  evidence	  proving	  that	  this	  claim	  holds	  true,	  which	  is	  why	  we	  present	  it	  
only	  as	  a	  potential	  threat	  to	  judicial	  independence.	  
75	  The	  Supreme	  Administrative	  Court	  introduced	  the	  memorandum	  in	  2012,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  2017.	  
76	  This	  concerns	  the	  Municipal	  Court	  in	  Prague,	  which	  introduced	  the	  testing	  in	  2014.	  Some	  other	  regional	  courts	  
use	  the	  testing	  as	  well	  (Regional	  Court	  in	  Pilsen,	  Regional	  Court	  in	  Brno);	  see	  Léko,	  supra	  note	  13.	  
77	  See	  Kosař	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  110–114.	  
78	  The	  exception	  was	  the	  early	  and	  mid-­‐1990s;	  see	  e.g.	  9	  PRÁVNÍ	  PRAXE	  (1995).	  
79	  David	  Kosař,	  Rozvrh	  práce:	  Klíčový	  nástroj	  pro	  boj	  s	  korupcí	  soudců	  a	  nezbytný	  předpoklad	  nezávislosti	  řadových	  
soudců,	  12	  PRÁVNÍK	  1060,	  1060–1066	  (2014).	  
80	  See	  id.,	  at	  1049–1076,	  and	  the	  newspaper	  articles	  cited	  there.	  
81	  The	  term	  “bankruptcy	  mafia”	  was	  coined	  for	  a	  group	  with	  alleged	  influence	  in	  the	  area.	  See	  id.,	  at	  1050.	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significantly	  curtailed	  the	  CPs’	  power	  to	  set	  the	  criteria.82	  Although	  this	  change	  may	  seem	  
marginal,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  ruling	  is	  considerable:	  by	  narrowing	  the	  space	  for	  rigging	  a	  case	  
assignment,	   it	   potentially	   boosted	   the	   output	   independence	   of	   individual	   judges	   and	  
reduced	  the	  possibility	  of	  corruption.	  
	  
Despite	  the	  abovementioned	  changes,	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  shift	  in	  the	  CPs’	  powers	  vis-­‐
à-­‐vis	   individual	   judges.	   For	   a	   long	   time,	   the	  position	  of	   CPs	   could	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   the	   key	  
challenge	  in	  Czechia,	  a	  challenge	  that	   is	  rarely	  addressed	  or	  thoroughly	  discussed	  outside	  
of	  academic	  circles.	  There	  are	  not	  many	  reported	  accounts	  of	  abuse	  of	  CPs’	  powers,83	  and	  
we	  cannot	  be	  sure	  how	  many	  remain	  unnoticed;	  moreover,	  the	  case	  of	  Slovakia	  shows	  that	  
unchecked	   powers	   of	   CPs,	   combined	   with	   other	   actors,	   may	   yield	   truly	   pathological	  
results.84	  However,	  as	  the	  cases	  of	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  show,	  the	  external	  threat	  to	  judicial	  
independence	   is	  gaining	  momentum	  and	  may	  become	  an	  urgent	  problem	   in	  a	  very	  short	  
time,	   once	   again	   shifting	   the	   focus	   to	   the	   relationship	   of	   the	   judiciary	   with	   the	   other	  
branches	  of	  power.	  
	  
II.	  On	  Powers	  to	  Discipline	  
	  
Only	   two	  of	   the	   JSG	   related	  modifications	  discussed	   in	   the	   first	   section	  had	  considerable	  
impact	  on	   judicial	  accountability	  –	   the	  2002	  and	  the	  2008	  reforms	  that	  changed	  the	  way	  
judges	   were	   disciplined.	   However,	   there	   certainly	   were	   changes	   in	   (the	   use	   of)	   other	  
accountability	  mechanisms	  available	  in	  Czechia	  –	  reassignment	  within	  the	  same	  court,	  case	  
assignment,	  promotion	  to	  a	  higher	  court,	  promotion	  to	  the	  position	  of	  chamber	  president,	  
appointment	  to	  the	  grand	  chamber	  of	  the	  SC,	  secondment,	  temporary	  assignment	  outside	  
the	   judiciary,	   the	   appointment	   of	   a	   judge	   to	   the	   position	   of	   court	   president	   or	   vice-­‐
president	   or	   the	   complaint	   mechanism.85	   Nevertheless,	   these	   changes	   either	   had	   other	  
causes86	  or	  were	  practically	  untraceable	  as	  they	  were	  not	  changes	  to	  de	  jure	  mechanisms	  
and	  hard	  data	  on	  de	  facto	  use	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  are	  missing.	  
	  
Therefore,	  we	  concentrate	  on	  both	  de	   jure	  and	  de	  facto	  changes	   in	  the	  way	   judges	  were	  
disciplined	  after	  the	  2002	  and	  the	  2008	  reforms	  and	  only	  briefly	  discuss	  some	  changes	  to	  
                                            
82	  See	  especially	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Czech	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  15	  June	  2016,	  case	  no.	  I.	  ÚS	  2769/15;	  as	  well	  
as	   judgments	  of	   27	  May	  2004,	   case	  no.	   IV.	  ÚS	  307/03;	   judgment	  of	   27	   September	  2005,	   case	  no.	   I.	  ÚS	  93/99;	  
judgment	  of	  21	  April	  2009,	  case	  no.	  II.	  ÚS	  2747/08;	  judgment	  of	  28	  May	  2009,	  case	  no.	  II.	  ÚS	  2029/08;	  judgment	  
of	  20	  April	  2011,	  case	  no.	  IV.	  ÚS	  1302/10;	  and	  judgment	  of	  1	  November	  2012,	  case	  no.	  IV.	  ÚS	  2053/12.	  
83	  For	  an	  account	  of	  some	  of	  such	  incidents,	  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  117–118.	  
84	  See	  KOSAŘ,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  236–333.	  
85	  See	  KOSAŘ,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  187–235.	  
86	  See	   the	   case	  of	   changes	   to	   case	   assignment	   (work	   schedules)	   caused	  by	   a	   ruling	  of	   the	  Constitutional	   Court	  
described	  above.	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informal	   accountability.	   The	   2002	   reform	   brought	   three	   significant	   changes	   to	   de	   jure	  
accountability	   of	   judges.	   First,	   the	   presidents	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   and	   the	   Supreme	  
Administrative	   Court	   got	   the	   power	   to	   initiate	   proceedings	   not	   only	   against	   judges	   of	  
“their”	  courts,	  but	  also	  against	  the	  judges	  of	  all	  lower	  courts.	  As	  the	  presidents	  of	  high	  and	  
regional	  court	  already	  had	  such	  a	  power,	  the	  2002	  reform	  finalized	  the	  hierarchical	  model	  
of	  initiating	  disciplinary	  proceedings.	  Second,	  the	  disciplinary	  proceedings	  became	  unified.	  
Previously,	  district	  court	  judges	  had	  been	  disciplined	  by	  regional	  courts	  and	  could	  appeal	  to	  
the	  SC,	  regional	  and	  high	  court	   judges	  had	  been	  disciplined	  by	  high	  courts	  and	  could	  also	  
appeal	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Courts	  and	  Supreme	  Court	  judges	  had	  been	  disciplined	  by	  this	  very	  
court	  and	  thus	  could	  not	  appeal.	  Afterwards,	  all	  judges	  were	  disciplined	  by	  the	  high	  court	  
and	  could	  appeal	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  Third,	  the	  set	  of	  sanctions	  available	  was	  reduced	  
and,	  after	  the	  2002	  reform,	  disciplined	  judges	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  reassigned	  to	  a	  court	  of	  
the	   same	   or	   lower	   level.	   The	   2008	   reform	   also	   changed	   several	   de	   jure	   aspects	   of	  
disciplinary	  proceedings.	  First,	  since	  2008,	  not	  only	  could	  the	  CP	  of	  the	  relevant	  or	  a	  higher	  
court	  and	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  initiate	  the	  proceedings,	  but	  so	  could	  the	  President	  of	  the	  
Czech	   Republic.87	   Second,	   the	   composition	   of	   disciplinary	   panels	   changed	   significantly.	  
Whereas	  before	  the	  2008	  reform	  judges	  were	  judged	  (disciplined)	  only	  by	  judges,	  after	  the	  
reform	  mixed	  panels	  composed	  of	  3	  judges	  and	  3	  members	  of	  other	  legal	  professions	  were	  
introduced.88	   Third,	  whereas	   before	   the	   reform	   there	  was	   a	   possibility	   to	   appeal	   against	  
the	   decision	   issued	   in	   the	   disciplinary	   proceedings,89	   there	   was	   no	   such	   possibility	  
afterwards.90	   Fourth,	   a	   new	   type	   of	   disciplinary	   offense	   was	   introduced	   in	   2008	   –	   the	  
breach	  of	  CP	  duties.91	  
	  
As	   regards	   de	   facto	   accountability,	   both	   reforms	   seem	   to	   have	   had	   some	   impact	   on	   the	  
frequency,	   reasons	   and/or	  ways	   judges	  were	   actually	   disciplined.	   Kosař	   and	   Papoušková	  
came	   to	   the	   following	   conclusions	   when	   analysing	   decisions	   issued	   in	   disciplinary	  
                                            
87	   Compare	   art.	   8	   of	   the	   2002	   Disciplinary	   Code	   and	   of	   the	   2008	  Disciplinary	   Code.	   Note	   also,	   that	   the	   Public	  
Defender	  of	  Rights	  could	  initiate	  the	  proceedings	  against	  court	  officials.	  
88	  Compare	  art.	  4	  of	  the	  2002	  and	  2008	  Disciplinary	  Codes.	  
89	  Note	  that	  from	  1991	  to	  2002	  judges	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  had	  no	  such	  possibility,	  as	  in	  this	  period	  disciplinary	  
panels	   were	   assembled	   pursuant	   to	   a	   hierarchical	   pattern	   –	   disciplinary	   panels	   at	   regional	   courts	   decided	   on	  
motions	  against	  judges	  of	  district	  courts;	  disciplinary	  panels	  at	  high	  courts	  decided	  on	  motions	  against	  judges	  of	  
regional	  courts	  as	  well	  as	  against	  judges	  of	  the	  relevant	  high	  court;	  and	  disciplinary	  panels	  at	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  
decided	   on	  motions	   against	   judges	   of	   the	   Supreme	  Court.	   In	   the	   next	   period,	   i.e.	   from	  2002	   to	   2008,	   all	   first-­‐
instance	   disciplinary	   proceedings	   were	   held	   at	   high	   courts.	   Comp.	   art.	   5	   of	   the	   Law	   No.	   412/1991	   Coll.,	   on	  
Disciplinary	  Liability	  of	  Judges	  (hereinafter	  “1991	  Disciplinary	  Code”)	  and	  art.	  3	  of	  the	  2002	  Disciplinary	  Code.	  
	  
90	  Compare	  art.	  21	  of	  the	  2002	  and	  2008	  Disciplinary	  Codes.	  
91	   See	   art.	   87	   of	   the	   Law	   No.	   6/2002	   Coll,	   on	   Courts	   and	   Judges,	   as	   amended	   by	   the	   Law	  No.	   314/2008	   Coll.	  
Otherwise	   judges	  could	  still	  be	  disciplined	  for	   infringing	  upon	  dignity	  of	   the	   judicial	  office	  or	   threatening	  public	  
confidence	  in	  independent,	  impartial	  and	  just	  decision-­‐making	  of	  courts.	  
2018	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  in	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  Europe’s	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  Sheep?	   1967	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
proceedings	   initiated	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year	  1993	  till	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  2014.92	  
First,	  both	  reforms	  seem	  to	  have	  influenced	  the	  number	  of	  disciplinary	  motions.	  Whereas	  
before	   the	   2002	   reform	   on	   average	   26	  motions	   a	   year	  were	   filed,	   after	   the	   reform	   this	  
number	  increased	  to	  33	  and	  dropped	  again	  to	  28	  after	  the	  2008	  reform.	  Second,	  the	  2008	  
reform	  brought	  a	  slight	  increase	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  proceedings	  initiated	  by	  the	  Minister	  
of	  Justice.	  In	  the	  period	  1993-­‐2002,	  10	  %	  of	  proceedings	  were	  initiated	  by	  the	  Minister	  and	  
in	   the	   following	   period	   the	   number	   was	   nearly	   the	   same	   (9	   %),	   but	   in	   2008-­‐2014	   it	  
increased	   to	   16	   %.	   Third,	   after	   the	   2008	   reform	   judges	   were	   less	   often	   prosecuted	   for	  
having	  caused	  delays	  in	  court	  proceedings	  and	  more	  often	  for	  disciplinary	  offenses	  related	  
to	   judicial	   independence	  and	  ethics.	  More	  concretely,	  whereas	  before	  2002	  reform	  61	  %	  
and	  before	  the	  2008	  reform	  66	  %	  of	  disciplinary	  proceedings	  were	  initiated	  based	  on	  the	  
first	  grounds	  and	  7	  and	  9	  %	  based	  on	  the	  second,	  after	  the	  reform	  it	  changed	  to	  54	  and	  20	  
%.	   Fourth,	   the	   2008	   reform	   also	   brought	   a	   significant	   decrease	   in	   the	   proportion	   of	  
disciplinary	  proceedings	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  imposing	  of	  a	  sanction.	  The	  proportion	  was	  55	  
%	  in	  the	  period	  of	  1993-­‐2002;	  this	  increased	  to	  60%	  in	  the	  next	  period	  and	  dropped	  to	  40%	  
after	  the	  2008	  reform.	  All	  in	  all	  the	  successfulness	  of	  the	  disciplinary	  motions,	  measured	  as	  
the	   proportion	   of	   proceedings	   that	   resulted	   either	   in	   the	   imposing	   of	   a	   sanction	   or	   the	  
resignation	  of	  the	  disciplined	  judge,	  also	  dropped	  significantly	  after	  the	  2008	  reform,	  as	  it	  
was	  53	  %,	  whereas	  in	  1993-­‐2002	  it	  was	  68	  %	  and	  in	  2002-­‐2008	  even	  71	  %.	  	  
	  
Apart	   from	   the	   abovementioned	   changes,	   judicial	   accountability	   also	   evolved	   in	   its	  
informal	  aspect.	  Judges	  are	  more	  and	  more	  often	  scrutinized	  by	  the	  media	  and	  the	  broader	  
public93	  and,	  as	  CPs	  will	  eventually	  lose	  their	  offices,	  they	  may	  feel	  the	  urge	  to	  please	  the	  
judges	  of	   the	  court	   in	  which	   they	  preside,	   i.e.	   their	   future	  colleagues.	  However,	  only	   the	  
last	   of	   these	   evolvements	   can	   be	   directly	   related	   to	   a	   concrete	   event,	   let	   alone	   to	   a	  
concrete	  modification	  in	  JSG	  in	  Czechia.	  
	  
III.	  On	  Mandates,	  Selection	  and	  Legitimacy	  
	  
It	  is	  hard	  to	  put	  a	  finger	  on	  a	  concept	  like	  judicial	  legitimacy	  alone,	  and	  it	  may	  prove	  even	  
more	  difficult	  to	  cover	  the	  effects	  that	  JSG	  changes	  had	  on	  it.94	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  possible	  
to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  following	  the	  (legal)	  rules	  in	  the	  first	  place	  which	  provides	  any	  organ	  with	  a	  
basic	  source	  of	  legitimacy.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  limiting	  CPs’	  mandates	  may	  
have	   indirectly	   caused	  a	  decrease	  of	   judicial	   legitimacy	   in	   its	   legal	  dimension.95	  Although	  
                                            
92	  KOSAŘ	  &	  PAPOUŠKOVÁ,	  supra	  note	  27.	  
93	  In	  2010,	  a	  website	  platform	  for	  discussing	  personal	  experience	  with	  individual	  judges	  and	  opinions	  on	  them	  was	  
launched.	  See	  znamysoudce.cz.	  
94	   To	   avoid	   overlap	   with	   the	   account	   of	   impact	   on	   public	   opinion,	   we	   omit	   the	   social	   dimension	   of	   judicial	  
legitimacy.	  
95	  This	  understanding	  connects	  legitimacy	  with	  legality	  and	  claims	  that	  judiciary	  is	   legitimate	  when	  it	  adheres	  to	  
legal	  rules;	  see	  e.g.	  CARL	  SCHMITT,	  LEGALITY	  AND	  LEGITIMACY	  (2004);	  and	  DAVID	  DYZENHAUS,	  LEGALITY	  AND	  LEGITIMACY:	  CARL	  
1968 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  	   Vol.	  19	  No.	  07	  
the	   change	   of	   law	   and	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   did	   not	   cause	   a	  
decrease	   in	   legal	   judicial	   legitimacy,	   the	   subsequent	   conduct	   of	   several	   CPs,	   who	  
circumvented	  these	  rules	  to	  retain	  their	  mandates,96	  surely	  did	  have	  some	  impact.	  
	  
Two	  other	  changes	   in	   JSG	  had	  potential	   influence	  on	  the	  normative	  dimension	  of	   judicial	  
legitimacy.97	  In	  the	  first	  place,	  we	  must	  mention	  the	  selection	  of	  judges,	  which	  is	  arguably	  
the	  area	  with	  the	  greatest	  importance	  for	  judicial	  legitimacy,	  the	  current	  state	  of	  which	  is	  
one	  of	  the	  biggest	   legitimacy	   issues.	  As	  the	  rules	  for	  selection	  are	   in	  the	  hands	  of	  (some)	  
CPs	   and	   are	   rather	   opaque	   at	  most	   courts,	   any	   improvement	   here	   should	   boost	   judicial	  
legitimacy.98	  Despite	  partial	   improvement	   in	   this	  area	   (notably	   regarding	   the	  selection	  of	  
judges	  at	  the	  SC,	  the	  SAC,	  and	  the	  Municipal	  Court	  in	  Prague99),	  the	  rules	  are	  still	  far	  from	  
unified	  and	  transparent.	  The	  2003	  change	  in	  the	  age	  limit	  for	  a	  judge’s	  eligibility	  for	  office	  
from	   25	   to	   30	   years	  may	   have	   resulted	   in	   a	  minor	   boost	   in	   legitimacy.100	   Secondly,	   the	  
introduction	  of	  judicial	  boards	  in	  2002	  promised	  that	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  courts	  would	  be	  
run	  somewhat	  more	  democratically,	   constraining	   to	  a	  certain	  degree	   the	  monocratic	  CPs	  
and	  possibly	  boosting	   legitimacy.	  Whether	  this	   in	   fact	  happened	  depends	  significantly	  on	  
the	  person	  of	  the	  CP.	  
	  
There	   are	   other	   judicial	   legitimacy	   issues	   in	   Czechia,	   although	   non-­‐JSG	   related,	   that	   are	  
worth	   mentioning.	   The	   foremost	   of	   these	   is	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   judiciary	   and	   its	  
changes	   after	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   communist	   regime.	   After	   the	   Velvet	   Revolution,	   the	   new	  
regime	  attempted	  to	  purge	  the	  judiciary	  from	  judges	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  execution	  of	  
the	   “communist	   justice”.101	   Still,	   many	   judges	   who	   were	   former	   members	   of	   the	  
Communist	   Party	   remained	   in	   the	   judiciary102	   and	   a	   list	   of	   them	  was	   published	   after	   an	  
intervention	   by	   the	   CC,103	   which	   may	   be	   seen	   by	   many	   as	   delegitimizing	   the	   judiciary.	  
                                                                                                                
SCHMITT,	  HANS	  KELSEN	  AND	  HERMAN	  HELLER	  IN	  WEIMAR	  (1999);	  and	  various	  contributions	  in	  LEGITIMACY	  IN	  INTERNATIONAL	  
LAW	  (Rudiger	  Wolfrum	  &	  Volker	  Roeben	  eds.,	  2008).	  
96	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  110–112;	  Ladislav	  Derka,	  Pro	  soudní	  funkcionáře	  právo	  neplatí?	  4	  SOUDCE	  7	  (2015);	  
Viktor	  Derka,	  Ústavnost	  opakovaného	  jmenování	  soudních	  funkcionářů,	  23	  JURISPRUDENCE	  3	  (2014).	  
97	  See	  e.g.	  Peter	  G.	  Stillman,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Legitimacy,	  7	  POLITY	  32	  (1974).	  
98	  Better	  rules	  for	  selection	  could	  have	  a	  sort	  of	  “trickle-­‐down	  effect”,	  as	  it	  may	  improve	  also	  the	  quality	  of	  judges	  
and,	  subsequently,	  of	  the	  judicial	  process	  and	  decisions.	  
99	  See	  supra	  notes	  75	  and	  76.	  
100	  Before,	  many	  may	  have	  had	  the	  impression	  that	  “kids”	  with	  little	  life,	  to	  say	  nothing	  of	  legal,	  experience,	  sit	  on	  
the	  bench;	  see	  Kühn	  2012,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  614.	  
101	   For	   an	   overview,	   see	   KOSAŘ,	   supra	   note	   5,	   at	   167–173;	   and	  David	   Kosař,	  The	   Least	   Accountable	   Branch,	   11	  
INTERNATIONAL	  JOURNAL	  OF	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  LAW	  234,	  251–252	  (2013).	  
102	  At	  the	  beginning,	  almost	  two	  thirds	  of	  judges	  were	  ex-­‐communists.	  
103	  See	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Czech	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  15	  November	  2010,	  case	  no.	  I.	  ÚS	  517/10.	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Secondly,	   the	   Czech	   judiciary	   has	   often	   been	   criticized	   for	   the	   excessive	   length	   of	  
proceedings.104	   Even	   though	   this	   criticism	   lacks	   objective	   foundation,105	   the	   “slow	  
judiciary”	  myth	  seems	  to	  persist.106	  	  
	  
The	   third	   legitimacy	   issue	   is	   corruption	   inside	   the	   judiciary,	   which	   always	   delegitimizes	  
judiciary	  as	  a	  whole,	  especially	  when	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  systemic	  and	  organized,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  
of	   the	   so-­‐called	   “bankruptcy	   mafia”.107	   Lastly,	   several	   high-­‐profile	   criminal	   cases	   with	  
(former)	   politicians108	   accused	   of	   corruption	   have	   been	   making	   their	   way	   through	   the	  
judiciary	   recently.	   Although	   cases	   of	   political	   corruption	   are	   understandably	   difficult	   to	  
judge	  and	  take	  a	  long	  time,	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  disagreement	  between	  courts	  often	  results	  in	  
higher	   courts	   quashing	   the	   decisions	   of	   lower	   courts.	   This	   in	   turn	   may	   create	   in	   some	  
people	  the	   impression	  that	  courts	  are	  both	  unable	  to	  “finish”	  the	  cases	  because	  they	  are	  
corrupt	  as	  well,	  and	  that	  criminal	  justice	  is	  being	  politicized	  and	  serves	  a	  different	  purpose	  
than	  it	  should.	  
	  
IV.	  On	  Transparency	  
	  
There	  is	  only	  one	  change	  in	  judicial	  transparency	  that	  may	  be	  connected	  with	  (changes	  in)	  
JSG109	  and	  that	  is	  the	  opening	  up	  and	  standardizing	  of	  the	  selection	  procedure	  for	  judges	  at	  
one	  of	  the	  eight	  regional	  courts	  in	  Czechia.	  This	  change	  is	  related	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  
the	  Judicial	  Academy,	  as	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Municipal	  Court	  in	  Prague	  agreed	  with	  the	  JA	  
that	  it	  will	  administer	  written	  tests	  and	  score	  the	  candidates	  and	  thus	  determine	  who	  will	  
be	  invited	  for	  an	  interview.110	  As	  noted	  above,	  although	  one	  of	  the	  de	  jure	  aims	  of	  the	  JA	  is	  
to	  “participate	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  persons	  who	  apply	  for	  a	  position	  of	  a	  law	  clerk”,111	  except	  
                                            
104	  For	  this,	  Czechia	  was	  criticised	  many	  times	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  	  
105	   The	   length	   of	   proceedings	   in	   Czechia	   is,	   if	   compared	   to	   other	   EU	   countries,	   average.	   See	   the	   European	  
Commission’s	  2017	  EU	  Justice	  Scoreboard,	  at	  7–11.	  
106	  See	  for	  example	  Kristián	  Léko,	  Soudci	  by	  se	  „pod	  lupou“	  víc	  snažili,	  LIDOVÉ	  NOVINY,	  July	  17,	  2017,	  at	  5,	  where	  one	  
of	  the	  respondents,	  a	  professional	  lawyer,	  claimed	  that	  “If	  the	  judiciary	  is	  slow,	  at	  least	  make	  it	  transparent.”	  
107	  See	  supra	  note	  81.	  
108	   This	   includes	   e.g.	   the	   former	   Prime	  Minister	   Petr	   Nečas	   and	   his	   spouse	   Jana	  Nečasová,	   former	  Minister	   of	  
Health	  David	  Rath,	   and	  Marek	  Dalík,	   an	   influential	   lobbyist	   and	  an	  advisor	   to	   the	   former	  Prime	  Minister	  Mirek	  
Topolánek.	  
109	  Note	   that	  we	  are	   speaking	  mainly	   about	   systemic	   changes,	   as	   “local”	   (i.e.	   court	   specific)	   changes	   in	   judicial	  
transparency	  may	  appear	  any	  time	  a	  new	  court	  president	   is	  appointed	  and	  thus	  has	  an	  opportunity	   to	  adopt	  a	  
new	  transparency	  policy.	  
110	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Léko,	  supra	  note	  13.	  
111	  See	  art.	  132	  of	  the	  Law	  6/2002	  Sb.,	  on	  Court	  and	  Judges.	  
1970 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  	   Vol.	  19	  No.	  07	  
for	   the	   case	   just	   mentioned	   neither	   this	   very	   aim	   nor	   its	   modification	   consisting	   in	   the	  
participation	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  judges	  was	  actually	  ever	  fully	  realized.112	  
	  
Other	  changes	  in	  judicial	  transparency	  were	  connected	  rather	  with	  two	  other	  evolvements	  
–	   the	   adoption	   of	   Law	   No.	   106/1999	   Coll.,	   on	   Free	   Access	   to	   Information,	   and	   the	  
advancement	   in	   information	  and	  communications	   technologies.	  The	   first	  evolvement,	   for	  
instance,	  opened	  a	  way	  to	  find	  out	  which	   judges	  were	  members	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  
before	  1989113	  or	  which	  constitutional	  justices	  deal	  with	  the	  cases	  assigned	  to	  them	  in	  the	  
most	   timely	   and	   responsive	   manner.114	   The	   second	   evolvement	   mainly	   brought	   the	  
possibility	  to	  publish	  court	  decisions	  online.	  So	  far,	  only	  the	  top	  three	  courts	  have	  taken	  full	  
advantage	  of	   this	  possibility.115	  The	  decisions	  of	  other	  Czech	  courts	  have	  been	  published	  
since	  2011,	  but	  only	  to	  a	  very	  limited	  extent.116	  While	  the	  non-­‐apex	  courts	  were	  instructed	  
by	  the	  Ministry	  to	  publish	  every	   important	  decision,	   in	  2015,	  for	   instance,	  they	  published	  
only	  75	  of	   them.117	  Another	  step	  that	  was	  made	  possible	  due	  to	   the	  advancement	   in	   ICT	  
was	   the	  2007	   launch	  of	   the	  “eJustice”	   (electronic	   justice)	  project.	  The	  project	   resulted	   in	  
the	  creation	  of	  an	  online	   form	  for	   filing	  an	  electronic	  payment	  order	  and	   for	  making	  any	  
other	  submission	  to	  a	  court;	  the	  publication	  of	  dates,	  times	  and	  venues	  of	  court	  hearings	  
and	  of	   information	   regarding	   the	   state	  of	   court	  proceedings;	   and	   in	   the	  aggregation	  and	  
publication	  of	  statistics	  on	  the	  activity	  of	  individual	  courts.118	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  since	  2015	  
all	   courts	   publish	   information	   on	   their	   contracts	   and	   paid	   invoices	   in	   a	   central	   online	  
database	  that	  is	  accessible	  free	  of	  charge.119	  
	  
All	  these	  developments	  influenced	  not	  only	  the	  way	  relevant	  information	  is	  made	  available	  
and	  findable	  but	  they	  also	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  who	  uses	  it.	  It	  is	  logical	  that	  before	  launching	  
                                            
112	  Only	  three	  more	  of	  the	  eight	  regional	  courts	  organize	  an	  open	  selection	  procedure	  for	  law	  clerks,	  but	  they	  do	  
so	  without	  assistance	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Academy.	  
113	   The	  MoJ	   published	   a	   list	   of	   such	   judges	   following	   to	   the	   judgment	   of	   the	   Czech	   Constitutional	   Court	   of	   15	  
November	  2010,	  case	  no.	  I.	  ÚS	  517/10.	  	  
114	   See	   Tomáš	   Němeček,	   Tajná	   data	   z	   Ústavního	   soudu,	   LIDOVÉ	   NOVINY,	   February	   28,	   2011;	   Tomáš	   Němeček,	  
Zachraňte	  doktora	  Balíka,	  LIDOVÉ	  NOVINY,	  March	  5,	  2012;	  and	  Tomáš	  Němeček,	  Doktorka	  Lastovecká	  se	  topí,	  LIDOVÉ	  
NOVINY,	  February	  23,	  2013.	  
115	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   began	   publishing	   all	   its	   decisions	   online	   in	   2000.	   The	   newly	   established	   Supreme	  
Administrative	  Courts	  followed	  this	  path	  and	  started	  publishing	  all	  decisions	  online	  soon	  after	  its	  establishment	  in	  
2003.	  The	  Constitutional	  Court	  made	  this	  step	  in	  2006.	  
116	  They	  are	  accessible	  through	  http://www.nsoud.cz/Judikaturans_new/judikatura_vks.nsf/uvod.	  	  
117	   The	  Office	  of	   the	  Public	  Defender	  of	  Rights,	  2017.	  Výroční	   zpráva	  2016,	   at	  57:	  https://www.ochrance.cz/file	  
admin/user_upload/zpravy_pro_poslaneckou_snemovnu/Vyrocni-­‐zprava2016_web.pdf	  	  
118	  For	  more	  details	  see	  the	  web	  http://www.reformajustice.cz/ejustice/	  and	  other	  websites	  it	  references.	  
119	  See	  http://data.justice.cz/SitePages/DomovskaStranka.aspx.	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the	  relevant	  databases	  only	  big	  entities	   like	  the	  MoJ	  or	  companies	  developing	  and	  selling	  
legal	  information	  systems	  could	  make	  use	  of	  the	  information.	  However,	  currently	  also	  the	  
media,	   researchers	   and	   civil	   society	   can	   easily	   utilize	   it.	   Nevertheless,	   despite	   all	   these	  
changes,	   judicial	   transparency	   remains	   a	   much-­‐debated	   issue	   as	   the	   public	   still	   lacks	  
information	  on	  the	  activity	  of	  individual	  judges120	  or	  on	  individual	  candidates	  for	  a	  judicial	  
position.121	  
	  
V.	  On	  Public	  Confidence	  
	  
Changes	   in	   JSG	  can	  have	  repercussions	  not	  only	   for	   the	   legal	  and	  political	   fields,	  but	  also	  
for	  the	  wider	  social	  field,	   i.e.	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  public.	   In	  
general,	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	   indicators	   of	   this	   relationship	   is	   the	   level	   of	   public	  
confidence,	   which	   can	   be	   described	   as	   the	   public’s	   belief	   in	   the	   reliability,	   honesty	   and	  
ability	   of	   courts	   and	   judges,	   and	   the	  belief	   that	   the	   courts	   act	   competently	   in	   the	   sense	  
that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  perform	  the	  functions	  that	  are	  legally	  or	  constitutionally	  assigned	  to	  
them.122	  	  
	  
Public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   stems	   from	   two	   broad	   groups	   of	   factors:123	   cultural	  
(confidence	   originates	   in	   long-­‐standing	   and	   deeply-­‐seated	   beliefs	   that	   are	   rooted	   in	  
cultural	  norms)	  and	  institutional	  (confidence	  is	  related	  to	  institutional	  performance).	  Thus,	  
the	  influence	  of	  changes	  in	  JSG	  on	  the	  level	  of	  public	  confidence	  is	  predominantly	  indirect,	  
and	  this	  only	  happens	   in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  changes	  somehow	  affect	  the	  performance	  of	  
the	  courts	  and	  judges.	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  there	  was	  no	  JSG	  “big	  bang”	  in	  Czechia	  that	  
would	  have	  had	  this	  power.	  However,	  the	  Czech	  example	  shows	  that	  a	  judiciary	  can	  enjoy	  
a	   reasonable	   level	   of	   public	   confidence	   even	  without	   adopting	   a	   strong	  model	   of	   JSG	  or	  
establishing	  a	  judicial	  council.	  	  
	  
As	   pictured	   in	   Figure	   1,	   trust	   in	   courts,	   measured	   continually	   since	   1990,	   is	   gradually	  
increasing.	   The	   trend	   seems	   to	   be	   influenced	   chiefly	   by	   broader	   historical	   socio-­‐political	  
development.	  In	  1990,	  shortly	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  regime,	  public	  confidence	  
in	  courts	  was	  very	   low,	  with	  a	  considerably	  higher	  percentage	  of	  distrusting	  respondents	  
(almost	   double)	   than	   trusting	   ones.	   As	   summarized	   by	   Sztompka,124	   in	   communist	  
countries,	  trusting	  the	  state	  and	   its	  political	   institutions,	   including	  courts	  and	  judges,	  was	  
                                            
120	  Note	  that,	  for	  instance,	  in	  Slovakia	  such	  information	  is	  available	  through	  the	  website	  https://otvorenesudy.sk/.	  	  
121	  However,	  see	  above	  for	  information	  on	  the	  quite	  transparent	  selection	  of	  judges	  for	  the	  two	  apex	  courts.	  
122	   George	  W.	   Dougherty,	   Stefanie	   A.	   Lindquist	   &	  Mark	   D.	   Bradbury,	   Evaluating	   Performance	   in	   State	   Judicial	  
Institutions:	  Trust	  and	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Georgia	  Judiciary,	  38	  STATE	  AND	  LOCAL	  GOVERNMENT	  REVIEW	  176	  (2006).	  
123	  William	  Mishler	   &	   Richard	   Rose,	  What	   Are	   the	   Origins	   of	   Political	   Trust?	   Testing	   Institutional	   and	   Cultural	  
Theories	  in	  Post-­‐communist	  Societies,	  34	  COMPARATIVE	  POLITICAL	  STUDIES	  30	  (2001).	  
124	  PIOTR	  SZTOMPKA,	  TRUST:	  A	  SOCIOLOGICAL	  THEORY	  (2000).	  
1972 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  	   Vol.	  19	  No.	  07	  
seen	  as	  naive	  and	  stupid.	  Moreover,	  under	  the	  authoritarian	  regime,	  the	  judicial	  profession	  
suffered	  from	  low	  prestige	  (both	  in	  social	  and	  financial	  terms)125	  and	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  
unattractive	   and	   corrupt.	   After	   1989,	   public	   confidence	   in	   courts	   has	   gradually	   been	  
restored,	   probably	   a	   sign	  of	   a	   successful	   transformation	   that	   also	   included	   a	   turnover	   in	  
judicial	   ranks.	   In	  2006,	  the	  share	  of	  respondents	  trusting	   in	  courts	  exceeded	  the	  share	  of	  
distrusting	   respondents	   for	   the	   first	   time	   and,	   after	   some	   volatility,	   this	   has	   become	   a	  
stable	  pattern	  since	  2014.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Trust	  in	  courts	  in	  Czechia,	  1990-­‐2017	  (in	  %)126	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   institutional	   confidence,	   it	   is	   also	   important	   to	   assess	  public	   confidence	   in	  
judges,	   as	   confidence	   in	   institutions	   can	   differ	   from	   confidence	   in	   individuals.	  
Unfortunately,	   a	   continual	   measurement	   of	   public	   confidence	   in	   judges	   is	   missing	   in	  
Czechia.	  As	   a	   proxy	   indicator,	   prestige	  of	   judges	   (as	   a	   profession),	  measured	   since	  2004,	  
can	  be	  used.	  As	  pictured	  in	  Figure	  2,	  the	  social	  position	  of	  judges	  in	  the	  last	  almost	  fifteen	  
years	  has	  been	  very	  high,	  with	  no	  significant	  swings.	  Judges	  belong	  to	  the	  group	  of	  top	  ten	  
most	   prestigious	   professions	   according	   to	   the	   Czech	   public,	   together	   with	   doctors,	  
teachers,	   scientists	   and	   nurses.	   Thus,	   it	   seems	   that	   after	   the	   damage	   to	   prestige	   and	  
credibility	   of	   judges	   and	   courts	   caused	   in	   the	   previous	   regime,	   they	   have	   successfully	  
reclaimed	  their	  social	  position,	  or	  are	  at	  least	  on	  the	  way	  to	  doing	  so.127	  This	  is	  probably	  an	  
                                            
125	  See,	  e.	  g.	  KÜHN	  2011,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  53.	  
126	  Source:	  Czech	  Social	  Science	  Data	  Archive	  of	  the	  Czech	  Institute	  of	  Sociology.	  The	  remainder	  (to	  100	  %)	  are	  "do	  
not	   know"	   answers.	   The	   question	   asked	   was:	   “Please	   tell	   us,	   do	   you	   trust	   or	   distrust	   the	   courts?”	   Possible	  
answers:	  I	  definitely	  trust/I	  rather	  trust/I	  rather	  distrust/I	  definitely	  distrust	  them.	  
127	  The	  restoration	  of	  the	  social	  position	  of	  judges	  becomes	  evident	  also	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  rise	  of	  their	  salaries.	  
In	  Czechoslovakia	   in	  the	  1950s,	   judges’	  salaries	  were	  only	  slightly	  above	  the	  national	  average	  salary,	  and	  below	  
e.g.	  miners’	   or	   bus	   drivers’	   salaries,	   see	   OTA	  ULČ,	  MALÁ	   DOZNÁNÍ	   OKRESNÍHO	   SOUDCE	   76	   (1974).	   In	   2017,	   a	   judge’s	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effect	   of	   a	   broader	   successful	   transformation	   process	   of	   the	   judiciary	  managed	   without	  
blatant	   scandals	   or	   affairs	   eroding	   the	   emerging	   public	   confidence	   in	   courts	   or	   judges.	  
However,	   the	   forms	   or	   levels	   of	   JSG	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   play	   any	   distinct	   direct	   role	   in	   this	  
process.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  2	  Prestige	  of	  the	  top	  eight	  professions	  in	  Czechia,	  2004-­‐2016	  (in	  %)128	  
	  
VI.	  On	  Lateral	  Selection	  and	  Male	  Court	  Presidents	  
	  
As	  there	  were	  few	  JSG	  changes	  that	  would	  significantly	  affect	  the	  CIATL	  values,	   it	   follows	  
that	   such	  changes	  would	  have	   little	   impact	  on	  other	  values	  as	  well,	   apart	   from	  diversity.	  
The	  professional	  diversity	  of	  the	  judiciary	  may	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  the	  presidents’	  of	  
the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Administrative	  Court	   intentions	  to	  select	   judges	  not	  
only	  from	  the	  ranks	  of	  professional	  judges,	  but	  also	  from	  the	  ranks	  of	  academics	  and	  other	  
legal	   professions.129	   It	  was,	   however,	   only	   at	   the	   Supreme	  Administrative	   Court	   that	   the	  
change	  was	  actually	   implemented;	   it	   remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  this	  will	  be	  the	  case	  at	  
the	   Supreme	   Court	   as	   well;	   there	   are	   no	   signs	   of	   such	   change	   happening	   at	   the	   lower	  
courts.130	  Gender-­‐wise,	   the	  Czech	   judiciary	   is	   quite	   constantly131	   a	   predominantly	   female	  
                                                                                                                
(public)	  sector	  by	  the	  coefficient	  of	  3.	  The	  salary	  base	  is	  then	  in	  turn	  multiplied	  by	  a	  specific	  coefficient	  depending	  
on	  the	  position	  of	  a	  judge	  etc.	  	  
128 Source:	  Czech	  Social	  Science	  Data	  Archive	  of	  the	  Czech	  Institute	  of	  Sociology.	  Legend:	  The	  data	  in	  the	  figure	  
represent	  the	  average	  score	  of	  prestige	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1=the	  lowest	  prestige	  to	  99=the	  highest	  prestige.	  
129	  See	  the	  memos	  published	  by	  the	  CPs,	  supra	  note	  75.	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profession,	  with	  women	  occupying	  about	  66%	  of	  the	  posts	  at	  the	  district	  courts,	  57%	  of	  the	  
posts	   at	   the	   regional	   courts,	   44%	   of	   the	   posts	   at	   the	   high	   courts,	   and	   25%	   at	   the	   apex	  
courts,132	  although	  the	  positions	  of	  CPs	  and	  vice-­‐presidents,	  especially	  at	  the	  higher	  courts,	  
tend	  to	  be	  dominated	  by	  men.133	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  no	  available	  data	  about	  the	  ethnic	  
diversity	   of	   the	   Czech	   judiciary,	   but	   we	   may	   safely	   guess	   that	   it	   reflects	   the	   mostly	  
homogeneous	   Czech	   population.	   Thus,	   no	   apparent	   changes,	   including	   those	   related	   to	  
JSG,	  took	  place	  that	  would	  affect	  the	  gender	  or	  ethnic	  diversity	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  
	  
C.	  Place	  of	  Court	  Presidents	  in	  the	  Separation	  of	  Powers	  and	  their	  Link	  to	  the	  People	  
	  
In	  this	  final	  section,	  we	  take	  a	  step	  back	  from	  the	  five	  values	  and	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  JSG	  
on	  the	  modern	  state	  in	  a	  more	  general	  sense,	  namely	  on	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  separation	  
of	  powers	  and	   the	  democratic	  principle.	   Similarly	   to	   the	  previous	  parts,	   it	   is	   the	  position	  
and	  powers	  of	  CPs,	  who	  most	  often	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  power,	  
which	  pose	   the	  biggest	   challenge	   to	   the	   separation	  of	  powers.	  This	   is	   caused	  by	   the	   fact	  
that	  court	  administration	  in	  Czechia	  has	  traditionally	  belonged	  to	  the	  executive	  branch,134	  
the	  telling	  proof	  of	  which	  is	  that	  the	  term	  “state’s	  administration	  of	  courts”	  is	  used	  to	  this	  
day.135	   We	   have	   already	   stated	   that	   the	   state	   administration	   of	   courts	   is	   a	   task	   of	   CPs	  
together	  with	  the	  MoJ.136	  As	  there	  can	  be	  no	  doubt	  that	  MoJ	  is	  part	  of	  the	  executive,	  it	  is	  
the	  role	  of	  CPs	  that	  may	  create	  confusion.	  Until	  2008,	   it	  was	  safe	  to	  assert	  that	  CPs	  were	  
part	  of	  the	  executive	  power,	  as	  they	  carried	  out	  a	  role	  that	  was	  traditionally	  understood	  as	  
executive	  and	  the	  rules	   that	  apply	   in	   the	  administration	  applied	  to	   them	  as	  well.137	  After	  
2008,	  however,	   the	  position	  of	  CPs	  changed.	  The	  Constitutional	  Court	  declared	   that	  CPs’	  
specific	   role	   is	   to	   ensure	   the	   proper	   functioning	   of	   the	   judiciary	   (separation	   of	  
functions/institutions),138	  and,	  consequently,	   it	  struck	  down	  a	  provision	  that	  declared	  CPs	  
part	  of	  the	  public	  administration	  for	  personal	  incompatibility.139	  As	  a	  result,	  CPs	  are	  on	  the	  
                                                                                                                
131	  Kühn	  2010,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  191,	  reports	  that	  in	  2001	  the	  numbers	  were	  quite	  similar.	  
132	  See	  České	  soudnictví	  2016:	  Výroční	  statistická	  zpráva,	  Ministerstvo	  spravedlnosti,	  2017,	  at	  12,	  53,	  94,	  105,	  and	  
111.	   The	   causes	   of	   underrepresentation	   of	   women	   at	   the	   upper	   echelons	   of	   the	   Czech	   judiciary	   are	   not	   yet	  
determined.	  
133	  See	  http://portal.justice.cz/Justice2/Soudci/soudci.html.	  
134	  This	  tradition	  dates	  to	  the	  times	  of	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  Empire;	  see	  PRINC,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  209–220.	  
135	  See	  Art.	  119	  of	   the	  Law	  no.	  6/2002	  Sb.,	  On	  Courts	  and	  Judges;	  and	  art.	  74(2)	  of	   the	  Law	  no.	  6/2002	  Sb.,	  On	  
Courts	   and	   Judges,	   which	   explicitly	   admits	   that	   the	   function	   of	   the	   court	   president	   is	   part	   of	   the	   public	  
administration.	  
136	  Art.	  119(2)	  of	  the	  Law	  no.	  6/2002	  Sb.,	  On	  Courts	  and	  Judges.	  
137	  Especially	  the	  rule	  that	  who	  appoints,	  dismisses	  as	  well.	  
138	  Judgment	  of	  the	  Czech	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  11	  July	  2006,	  case	  no.	  Pl.	  ÚS	  18/06.	  
139	  Judgment	  of	  the	  Czech	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  4	  May	  2010,	  case	  no.	  Pl.	  ÚS	  7/09.	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one	  hand	  a	  part	  of	  the	  public	  administration	  with	  administrative	  powers,	  but	  on	  the	  other,	  
their	  position	  is	  protected	  by	  judicial	  independence,	  which	  makes	  them	  what	  could	  be	  best	  
described	  as	  sui	  generis	  members	  of	  the	  public	  administration.	  Accordingly,	  as	  the	  position	  
of	  CPs	  was	  no	  longer	  of	  a	  predominantly	  executive	  nature,	  and	  the	  rules	  applicable	  in	  the	  
executive	   no	   longer	   applied	   to	   them,	   we	   can	   now	   say	   that	   the	   role	   of	   CPs,	   and	   the	  
separation	  of	  powers	  with	  it,	  was	  altered.	  	  
	  
We	  now	  briefly	  turn	  to	  the	  democratic	  principle.	  This	  principle	  requires	  that	  the	  people	  are	  
more	  or	  less	  directly	  connected	  with	  their	  representatives	  and	  it	  has	  always	  been	  a	  part	  of	  
debates	   concerning	   the	   Czech	   judiciary,	   although	   different	   terms	   have	   often	   been	   used.	  
For	  instance,	  during	  the	  2017	  parliamentary	  elections,	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  nine	  later	  elected	  
political	  parties	  emphasized	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  judges	  and	  their	  work	  had	  to	  be	  subjected	  
to	  public	  inspection	  and	  that	  judges	  had	  to	  be	  personally	  accountable	  for	  the	  judgements	  
they	   issue.140	   These	  measures	  were	   to	   ensure	   that	   people	   knew	  who	   the	   judge	  deciding	  
their	   case	  was	   and	  how	  well	   she	  performed	  her	   function.	   Therefore,	   although	   there	  has	  
never	  been	  a	  proposal	  in	  Czechia	  to	  introduce	  the	  election	  of	  judges	  by	  the	  people	  or	  the	  
Parliament,	  including	  people	  in	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  judiciary	  has	  been	  always	  called	  for.	  So	  
far,	  however,	   this	  has	  materialized	  only	   in	   the	   introduction	  of	  non-­‐judicial	  members	   into	  
the	  disciplinary	  panels	  and	  in	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  Communist	  system	  of	  lay	  judges,	  i.e.	  
laymen	  who	  are	  elected	  by	  municipal	  or	  regional	  councils	  and	  have	  a	  majority	  say	  in	  some	  
matters	  decided	  at	  district	  and	  regional	  courts.141	  The	  legitimacy	  chain	  between	  the	  people	  
and	   judges	   thus	   remains	   rather	   loose,	   which	   is	   even	   more	   true	   in	   the	   case	   of	   court	  
presidents	   –	   the	   primary	   JSG	   actors	   –	   whose	   selection	   remains	   shrouded	   in	   mystery	   in	  




This	   article	   argued	   that,	   despite	   having	   no	   judicial	   council,	   there	   is	   indeed	   judicial	   self-­‐
government	   in	   Czechia.	   Firstly,	   it	   showed	   that	   there	   are	   several	   bodies	   that	   take	  part	   in	  
JSG,	  although	  the	  crucial	  role	  is	  played	  by	  the	  CPs,	  who	  hold	  substantial	  formal	  powers	  and	  
informal	  influence	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  power,	  namely	  the	  MoJ	  
(Section	  A).	   Furthermore,	   the	  article	   stressed	   that	   the	   lack	  of	   institutionalized	   JSG	   in	   the	  
form	  of	  a	  judicial	  council	  does	  not	  bar	  the	  judiciary	  from	  functioning	  properly	  in	  the	  wider	  
legal,	   political	   and	   social	   environment,	   although	   there	   are	   some	   problematic	   points	  
(Section	  B).	  Thus,	   the	   JSG	   in	  Czechia	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  facilitates,	  but,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
also	  potentially	  endangers	   judicial	   independence	  by	  concentrating	  power	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  
CPs;	  similarly,	  JSG	  may	  have	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  disciplinary	  motions,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  may	  have	  decreased	  their	  successfulness.	  By	  bringing	  transparency	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  
judges,	   CPs	   may	   have	   given	   the	   judiciary	   a	   legitimacy	   boost;	   nevertheless,	   by	   not	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respecting	   the	   prohibition	   of	   their	   own	   reappointment	   and	   because	   of	   the	   lack	   of	  
transparency	   in	   the	   informal	   JSG	   processes,	   the	   legitimacy	   may	   again	   suffer.	   As	   far	   as	  
public	   confidence	   in	   judiciary	  goes,	   it	   remains	   fairly	   strong	  and	  apparently	  unaffected	  by	  
the	  JSG	  issues.	  Finally,	  from	  a	  more	  general	  point	  of	  view	  (Section	  C),	  we	  have	  showed	  that	  
the	  JSG	  influenced	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  in	  Czechia	  in	  a	  peculiar	  way	  by	  making	  CPs	  sui	  
generis	   actors	   belonging	   somewhere	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	   executive	   branch,	  
while	  not	  contributing	  to	  the	  democratic	  connection	  between	  the	  people	  and	  the	  judiciary.	  
To	   sum	   up,	   calling	   Czechia	   the	   “black	   sheep”	   for	   not	   establishing	   a	   judicial	   council	  may	  
therefore	   not	   be	   appropriate,	   as	   the	   judiciary	   has	   been	   able	   to	   sustain	   a	   substantial	  
amount	  of	   JSG.	  Whether	   it	  will	   be	   able	   to	  hold	  onto	   it	   and	  manage	   to	   guard	   the	   crucial	  
values	  is	  a	  question	  that	  remains	  to	  be	  answered;	  whether	  a	  judicial	  council	  would	  help	  it	  
in	  this	  task	  can	  only	  be	  hypothesized.	  
	  
	  
	  
